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U.S. Supreme Court
THE AMISTAD, 40 U.S. 518 (1841)
40 U.S. 518
The AMISTAD.
UNITED STATES, Appellants,
v
The LIBELLANTS AND CLAIMANTS
of the SCHOONER AMISTAD, her tackle, apparel and furniture, together with her cargo,
and the AFRICANS mentioned and described in the several libels and claims, Appellees.
January Term, 1841
Begin Part I:
[40 U.S. 518, 521] APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Connecticut. On the 23d
day of January 1840, Thomas R. Gedney and Richard W. Meade, officers of the United
States surveying brig Washington, on behalf of themselves and the officers and crew
of the Brig Washington, and of others interested and entitled, filed a libel in the
district court of the United States for the district of Connecticut, stating, that
off Culloden Point, near Montauk Point, they took possession of a vessel which proved
to be a Spanish schooner, called the Amistad, of Havana, in the Island of Cuba, of
about 120 tons burden; and the said libellants found said schooner was manned by
forty-five negroes, some of whom had landed near the said point for water, [40
U.S. 518, 522] and there were also on board, two Spanish gentlemen, who represented
themselves to be, and as the libellants verily believed, were, part owners of the
cargo, and of the negroes on board, who were slaves belonging to said Spanish gentlemen;
that the schooner Amistad sailed, on the 28th day of June, A. D. 1839, from the port
of Havana, bound to a port in the province of Principe, both in the island of Cuba,
under the command of Raymon Ferrer, as master thereof; that the schooner had on board
and was laden with a large and valuable cargo, and provisions, to the amount, in
all, of $40,000, and also money to the sum and amount of about $250; and also fifty-four
slaves, to wit, fifty-one male slaves, and three young female slaves, who were worth
$25,000; and while on the voyage from Havana to Principe, the slaves rose upon the
master and crew of the schooner, and killed and murdered the master and one of the
crew, and two more of the crew escaped and got away from the schooner; that the two
Spaniards on board, to wit, Pedro Montez and Jose Ruiz, remained alive on board the
schooner, after the murder of the master, and after the negroes had taken possession
of the vessel and cargo; that their lives were spared, to assist in the sailing of
the vessel; and it was directed by the negroes, that the schooner should be navigated
for the coast of Africa; and Pedro Montez and Jose Ruiz did, accordingly, steer as
thus directed and compelled by the negroes, at the peril of their lives, in the day-time,
and in the night, altered their course and steered for the American shore; but after
two months on the ocean, they succeeded in coming round Montauk Point, when they
were discovered and boarded by the libellants, and the two Spanish gentlemen begged
for and claimed the aid and protection of the libellants. That the schooner was accordingly
taken possession of, and re- captured from the hands and possession of the negroes
who had taken the same: that the schooner was brought into the port of New London,
where she now was; and the schooner would, with great difficulty, exposure and danger,
have been taken by the libellants, but for the surprise upon the blacks who had possession
thereof, a part of whom were on shore; and but for the aid and assistance and services
of the libellants, the vessel and cargo would have been wholly lost to the respective
owners thereof. That the cargo [40 U.S. 518, 523] belonged to divers Spanish
merchants and others, resident in the island of Cuba, and to Pedro Montez and Jose
Ruiz, the latter owning most of the slaves. The libellants stated, that having saved
the schooner Amistad and cargo, and the slaves, with considerable danger, they prayed
that process should be issued against the same, and that the usual proceedings might
be had by the court, by which a reasonable salvage should be decreed out of the property
so saved.
Afterwards, Henry Green and Pelatiah Fordham and others, filed a petition and answer
to the libel, claiming salvage out of the property proceeded against by Thomas R.
Gedney and others, and stating, that before the Amistad was seen or boarded by the
officers and crew of the Washington, they had secured a portion of the negroes who
had come on shore, and had thus aided in saving the vessel and cargo.
On the 29th of August 1839, Jose Ruiz and Pedro Montez, of Cuba, filed claims to
all the negroes on board of the Amistad, except Antonio, as their slaves. A part
of the merchandize on board the vessel was also claimed by them. They alleged, that
the negroes had risen on the master of the schooner, and had murdered him; and that
afterwards, they, Ruiz and Montez, had brought her into the United States. They claimed,
that the negroes and merchandize ought to be restored to them, under the treaty with
Spain; and denied salvage to Lieutenant Gedney, and to all other persons claiming
salvage. Afterwards, Ruiz and Montez each filed in the district court, a separate
libel, stating more at large the circumstances of the voyage of the Amistad, the
murder of the master by the negroes, and that the negroes afterwards compelled them
to steer the vessel towards Africa, but that they contrived to bring her to the coast
of the United States, where she was captured by the United States brig Washington.
Ruiz, in his libel, stated the negroes belonging to him to have been forty-nine in
number, named and known at Havana, as follows: Antonio, Simon, Jose, Pedro, Martin,
Manuel, Andreo, Edwards, Celedonia, Burtolono, Ramia, Augustin, Evaristo, Casamero,
Merchoi, Gabriel, Santorin, Escolastico, Rascual, Estanislao, Desidero, Nicholas,
Estevan, Thomas, Cosme, Luis, Bartolo, Julian, Federico, Salustiano, [40 U.S.
518, 524] Ladislao, Celestino, Epifanio, Eduardo, Benancico, Felepe, Francisco,
Hipoleto, Berreto, Isidoro, Vecente, Deconisco, Apolonio, Esequies, Leon, Julio,
Hipoleto and Zenon; of whom several have died.' Their present names, Ruiz stated,
he had been informed, were, 'Cinque, Burnah 1st, Carpree, Dammah, Fourrie 1st, Shumah,
Conomah, Choolay, Burnah 2d, Baah, Cabbah, Poomah, Kimbo, Peea, Bang-ye-ah, Saah,
Carlee, Parale, Morrah, Yahome, Narquor, Quarto, Sesse, Con, Fourrie 2d, Kennah,
Lammane, Fajanah, Faah, Yahboy, Faquannah, Berrie, Fawnu, Chockammaw and Gabbow.'
The libel of Pedro Montez stated, that the names of three negroes on board the Amistad,
belonging to him, were Francisco, Juan and Josepha; the Spanish name of the fourth
was not mentioned; and the four were now called Teme, Mahgra, Kene and Carria. All
these were stated to be slaves, and the property of the claimants, purchased by them
at Havana, where slavery was tolerated and allowed by law; and they and the merchandize
on board the vessel, the claimants alleged, by the laws and usages of nations, and
of the United States of America, and according to the treaties between Spain and
the United States, ought to be restored to the claimants, without diminution, and
entire.
The vessel, negroes and merchandize were taken into his possession, by the marshal
of the district of Connecticut, under process issued by order of the court. 1
On the 19th of September 1837, William S. Holabird, Esq., attorney of the United
States for the district, filed a suggestion in the district court, stating, that
since the libel aforesaid of Thomas R. Gedney, Esq., was filed in this court, viz:
within the present month of September, in the year of our Lord 1839, the duly accredited
minister to the United States of her Catholic Majesty, the Queen of Spain, had officially
presented to the proper department of the United States government, a claim, which
was then pending, upon the United States, setting forth, that 'the vessel aforesaid,
called the Amistad, and her cargo aforesaid, together with certain slaves on board
the said vessel, all being the same as described in the libel aforesaid, are the
property of Spanish subjects, and that the said vessel, cargo and slaves, while so
being the property of the said Spanish subjects, arrived [40 U.S. 518, 525]
within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, and were taken possession
of by the said public armed brig of the United States, under such circumstances as
make it the duty of the United States to cause the same vessel, cargo and slaves,
being the property of said Spanish subjects, to be restored to the true proprietors
and owners of the same, without further hindrance or detention, as required by the
treaty now subsisting between the United States and Spain.' The attorney of the United
States, in behalf of the United States, prayed the court, on its being made legally
to appear that the claim of the Spanish minister was well founded, and was conformable
to the treaty, that the court make such order for the disposal of the said vessel,
cargo and slaves as might best enable the United States in all respect to comply
with their treaty stipulations, and preserve the public faith inviolate. But if it
should be made to appear, that the persons described as slaves, were negroes and
persons of color, who had been transported from Africa, in violation of the laws
of the United States, and brought within the United States, contrary to the same
laws, the attorney, in behalf of the United States, claimed, that in such case, the
court would make such further order in the premises, as would enable the United States,
if deemed expedient, to remove such persons to the coast of Africa, to be delivered
there to such agent or agents as might be authorized to receive and provide for them,
pursuant to the laws of the United States, in such case provided, or to make such
other order as to the court might seem fit, right and proper in the premises.
On the same day, September 19th, 1839, the negroes, by their counsel, filed an answer
to the libel of Lieutenant Gedney and others, claiming salvage, and to the claim
of Ruiz and Montez, claiming them as slaves, as also to the intervention of the United
States, on the application of the minister of Spain; in which they said, that they
were natives of Africa, and were born free, and ever since had been, and still of
right were and ought to be, free and not slaves; that they were never domiciled in
the island of Cuba, or in the dominions of the Queen of Spain, nor subject to the
laws thereof. That on or about the 15th day of April 1839, they were, in the land
of their nativity, unlawfully kidnapped, and forcibly and wrongfully, by certain
persons to them unknown, [40 U.S. 518, 526] who were there unlawfully and
piratically engaged in the slave-trade between the coast of Africa and the island
of Cuba, contrary to the will of these respondents, unlawfully, and under circumstances
of great cruelty, transported to the island of Cuba, for the unlawful purpose of
being sold as slaves, and were there illegally landed for that purpose. That Jose
Ruiz, one of the libellants, well knowing all the premises, and confederating with
the persons by whom the respondents were unlawfully taken and holden as slaves, and
intending to deprive the respondents severally of their liberty, made a pretended
purchase of the respondents, except the said Carria, Teme, Kene and Mahgra; and that
Pedro Montez, also well knowing all the premises, and confederating with the said
persons, for the purpose aforesaid, made a pretended purchase of the said Carria,
Teme, Kene and Mahgra; that the pretended purchases were made from persons who had
no right whatever to the respondents, or any of them, and that the same were null
and void, and conferred no right or title on Ruiz or Montez, or right of control
over the respondents, or either of them. That on or about the 28th day of June 1839,
Ruiz and Montez, confederating with each other, and with and Ramon Ferrer, now deceased,
master of the schooner Amistad, and others of the crew thereof, caused respondents,
severally, without law or right, under color of certain false and fraudulent papers
by them procured and fraudulently used for that purpose, to be placed by force on
board the schooner, to be transported, with said Ruiz and Montez, to some place unknown
to the respondents, and there enslaved for life. That the respondents, being treated
on board said vessel, by said Ruiz and Montez and their confederates, with great
cruelty and oppression, and being of right free, as aforesaid, were incited by the
love of liberty natural to all men, and by the desire of returning to their families
and kindred, to take possession of said vessel, while navigating the high seas, as
they had a right to do, with the intent to return therein to their native country,
or to seek an asylum in some free state, where slavery did not exist, in order that
they might enjoy their liberty under the protection of its government; that the schooner,
about the 26th of August 1839, arrived, in the possession of the respondents, at
Culloden Point, near Montauk, and was there anchored near the shore of Long Island,
within [40 U.S. 518, 527] hailing distance thereof, and within the waters
and territory of the state of New York; that the respondents, Cinque, Carlee, Dammah,
Baah, Monat, Nahguis, Quato, Con, Fajanah, Berrie, Gabbo, Fouleaa, Kimbo, Faquannah,
Cononia, otherwise called Ndzarbla, Yaboi, Burnah 1st, Shuma, Fawne, Peale, Ba and
Sheele, while said schooner lay at anchor as aforesaid, went on shore, within the
state of New York to procure provisions and other necessaries, and while there, in
a state where slavery is unlawful and does not exist, under the protection of the
government and laws of said state, by which they were all free, whether on board
of said schooner or no shore, the respondents were severally seized, as well those
who were on shore as aforesaid, as those who were on board of and in possession of
said schooner, by Lieutenant Gedney, his officers and crew, of the United States
brig Washington, without any lawful warrant or authority whatever, at the instance
of Ruiz and Montez, with the intent to keep and secure them as slaves to Ruiz and
Montez, respectively, and to obtain an award of salvage therefore from this honorable
court, as for a meritorious act. That for that purpose, the respondents were, by
Lieutenant Gedney, his officers and crew, brought to the port of New London; and
while there, and afterwards, under the subsequent proceedings in this honorable court,
taken into the custody of the marshal of said district of Connecticut, and confined
and held in the jails in the cities of New Haven and Hartford, respectively, as aforesaid.
Wherefore, the respondents prayed, that they might be set free, as they or right
were and ought to be, and that they be released from the custody of the marshal,
under the process of this honorable court, under which, or under color of which,
they were holden as aforesaid.
Jose Antonio Tellincas, and Aspe and Laca, subjects of Spain, and merchants of Cuba,
presented claims for certain merchandize which was on board the Amistad, when taken
possession of by Lieutenant Gedney; denying all claims to salvage, and asking that
the property should be restored to them.
On the 23d day of January, the district judge made a decree, having taken into his
consideration all the libels, claims and the suggestion of the district-attorney
of the United States, and the claim preferred by him that the negroes should be delivered
to [40 U.S. 518, 528] the Spanish authorities, the negroes to be sent by them
to Cuba, or that the negroes should be placed under the authority of the President
of the United States, to be transported to Africa. The decree rejected the claim
of Green and others to salvage, with costs. The claim of Lieutenant Gedney and others
to salvage on the alleged slaves, was dismissed. The libels and claims of Ruiz and
Montez, being included under the claim of the minister of Spain, were ordered to
be dismissed, with costs taxed against Ruiz and Montez respectively. 'That that part
of the claim of the minister of Spain which demands the surrender of Cinque and others,
who are specifically named in the answer filed as aforesaid, be dismissed, without
cost.' That the claim of the vice-consul of Spain, demanding the surrender to the
Spanish government of Antonio, a slave owned by the heirs of Captain Ferrer, should
be sustained; and ordered that Antonio should be delivered to the government of Spain,
or its agent, without costs. The claims of Tellincas, and Aspe and Laca, for the
restoration of the goods specified by them, being part of the cargo of the Amistad,
was sustained, and that the same goods be restored to them, deducting one-third of
the gross appraised value of them, which was allowed as salvage to the officers and
crew of the Washington. A like salvage of one-third of the gross value of the Amistad,
and the other merchandize on board of her, was also adjudged to the salvors. The
costs were to be deducted from the other two-thirds.
'And whereas, the duly-accredited minister of Spain, resident in the United States, hath, in behalf of the government of Spain, for the owners of said schooner, and the residue of said goods, claimed that the same be restored to that government, for the said owners, they being Spanish subjects, under the provisions of the treaty subsisting between the United States and Spain: And whereas, it hath been made to appear to this court, that the said schooner is lawfully owned by the subjects of Spain, as also the residue of said goods, not specifically claimed: And whereas, the aforesaid Don Pedro Montez and Jose Ruiz have in person ceased to prosecute their claim as specified in their respective libels, and their said claims fall within the demand [40 U.S. 518, 529] and claim of the Spanish minister, made as aforesaid, And whereas, the seizure of the said schooner and goods by the said Thomas R. Gedney and others, was made on the high seas, in a perilous condition, and they were first brought into the port of New London, within the district of Connecticut, and libelled for salvage.' The decree then proceeded to adjudge to Lieutenant Gedney and others, as salvage, one-third of the gross proceeds of the vessel and cargo, according to an appraisement which had been made thereof; and, if not paid, directed the property to be sold, and that proportion of the gross proceeds of the sale to be paid over to the captors, the residue, after payment of all costs, to be paid to the respective owners of the same.
Upon the answers of the negroes, and the representations of the district-attorney
of the United States, and of Montez and Ruiz, the decree proceeded: 'This court having
fully heard the parties appearing, with their proofs, do find, that the respondents,
severally answering as aforesaid, are each of them natives of Africa, and were born
free, and ever since have been, and still of right are free, and not slaves, as is
in said several libels claims or representations alleged or surmised; that they were
never domiciled in the Island of Cuba, or the dominions of the Queen of Spain, or
subject to the laws thereof; that they were severally kidnapped in their native country,
and were, in violation of their own rights, and of the laws of Spain, prohibiting
the African slave-trade, imported into the island of Cuba, about the 12th June 1839,
and were there unlawfully held and transferred to the said Ruiz and Montez, respectively;
that said respondents were, within fifteen days after their arrival at Havana, aforesaid,
by said Ruiz and Montez, put on board said schooner Amistad, to be transported to
some port in said island of Cuba, and there unlawfully held as slaves; that the respondents,
or some of them, influenced by the desire of recovering their liberty, and of returning
to their families and kindred in their native country, took possession of said schooner
Amistad, killed the captain and cook, and severely wounded said Montez, while on
her voyage from Havana, as aforesaid, and that the respondents arrived, in possession
of said schooner, at Culloden Point, near Montauk, and there anchored [40 U.S.
518, 530] said schooner on the high seas, at the distance of half a mile from
the shore of Long Island, and were there, while a part of the respondents were, as
is alleged in their said answer, on shore, in quest of water and other necessaries,
and about to sail in said schooner for the coast of Africa, seized by said Lieutenant
Gedney, and his officers and crew, and brought into the port of New London, in this
district. And this court both further find, that it hath ever been the intention
of the said Montez and Ruiz, since the said Africans were put on board the said schooner,
to hold the said Africans as slaves; that at the time when the said Cinque and others,
here making answer, were imported from Africa, into the dominions of Spain, there
was a law of Spain prohibiting such importations, declaring the persons so imported
to be free; that said law was in force when the claimants took the possession of
the said Africans and put them on board said schooner, and the same has ever since
been in force.' The decree of the district court recited the decree of the government
of Spain, of December 1817, prohibiting the slave-trade, and declaring all negroes
brought into the dominions of Spain by slave-traders to be free; and enjoining the
execution of the decree on all the officers of Spain in the dominions of Spain. The
decree of the district court proceeded: 'And this court doth further find, that when
the said Africans were shipped on board the said schooner, by the said Montez and
Ruiz, the same were shipped under the passports signed by the governor-general of
the Island of Cuba, in the following words, viz:
Description. Size. Age. Color. Hair. Forehead. Eyebrows. Eyes. Nose. Mouth. Beard.
Peculiar signs. Havana, June 22d, 1839.
I grant permission to carry three black ladinos, named Juana, Francisco, and Josefa,
property of Dr. Pedro Montez, to Puerto Principe, by sea. They must present themselves
to the respective territorial judge with this permit.
Duty, 2 reals. ESPLETA. (Indorsed)-Commander of Matria.
Let pass, in the schooner Amistad, to Guanaja, Ferrer, master. Havana, June 27th,
1839. MART. & CO. [40 U.S. 518, 531] Description. Size. Age. Color. Hair.
Forehead. Eyebrows. Eyes. Nose. Mouth. Beard. Peculiar signs.
Havana, June 26th, 1839.
I grant permission to carry forty-nine black ladinos, named Antonio, Simon, Lucas,
Jose, Pedro, Martin, Manuel, Andrios, Edwardo, Celedernnio, Bartolo, Raman, Augustin,
Evaristo, Casimero, Meratio, Gabriel, Santome, Ecclesiastico, Pasenal, Stanislao,
Desiderio, Nicolas, Estevan, Tomas, Cosme, Luis, Bartolo, Julian, Federico, Saturdino,
Ladislas, Celestino, Epifano, Fronerie, Venaniro, Feligre, Francisco, Hypolito, Benito,
Isdoro, Vicente, Dioniceo, Apolino, Eseuie l, Leon, Julio, Hipolito y Raman, property
of Dr. Jose Ruiz, to Puerto Principe; by sea. They must present themselves with this
permit to the respective territorial judge.
ESPLETA. Duty, 2 reals.
(Indorsed) Commander of Matria.
Let pass, in the schooner Amistad, to Guanaja, Ferrer, master. Havana, June 27th,
1839. MART. & CO.
'Which said passports do not truly describe the said persons shipped under the same. Whereupon, the said claim of the minister of Spain, as set forth in the two libels filed in the name of the United States, by the said district-attorney, for and in behalf of the government of Spain and her subjects, so far as the same relate to the said Africans named in said claim, be dismissed. And upon the libel filed by said district-attorney, in behalf of the United States, claiming the said Africans libelled as aforesaid, and now in the custody of the marshal of the district of Connecticut, under and by virtue of process issued from this court, that they may be delivered to the president of the United States to be transported to Africa: It is decreed, that the said Africans now in the custody of said marshal, and libelled and claimed as aforesaid (excepting Antonio Ferrer), be delivered to the president of the United States, by the marshal of the district of Connecticut, to be by him transported to Africa, in pursuance of [40 U.S. 518, 532] the law of congress, passed March 3d, 1819, entitled 'an act in addition to the acts prohibiting the slave-trade."
After the decree was pronounced, the United States, 'claiming in pursuance of a demand
made upon them by the duly-accredited minister of her Catholic Majesty, the Queen
of Spain, to the United States, moved an appeal from the whole and every part of
the said decree, except the part of the same in relation to the slave Antonio, to
the circuit court' of Connecticut. Antonio Tellincas, and Aspe and Laca, claimants,
&c., also appealed from the decree to the circuit court, except for so much of
the decree as sustained their claims to the goods, &c
The Africans, by their African names, moved in the circuit court, in April 1840,
that so much of the appeal of the district-attorney of the United States, from so
much of the decree of the district court as related to them severally, might be dismissed;
'because they say, that the United States do not claim, nor have they ever claimed,
any interest in the appellees, respectively, or either of them, and have no right,
either by the law of nations, or by the constitution or laws of the United States,
to appear in the courts of the United States, to institute or prosecute claims to
property, in behalf of the subjects of the Queen of Spain, under the circumstances
appearing on the record in this case; much less to enforce the claims of the subject
of a foreign government, to the persons of the said appellees, respectively, as the
slaves of the said foreign subjects, under the circumstances aforesaid.' The circuit
court refused the motion.
The circuit court affirmed the decree of the district court, pro form a, except so
far as respected the claims of Tellincas, and Aspe and Laca.
After this decree of the circuit court, the United States, claiming in pursuance
of a demand made upon them by the duly-accredited minister of her Catholic Majesty,
the Queen of Spain, to the United States, moved an appeal from the whole and every
part of the decree of the court, affirming the decree of the district court, to the
supreme court of the United States, to be holden at the city of Washington, on the
second Monday of January, A. D. 1841; and it was allowed. [40 U.S. 518, 533]
The court, as far as respected the decree of the district court allowing salvage
on the goods on board the Amistad, continued the case, to await the decision of the
supreme court, on that part of the decree appealed from.
The circuit court, in the decree, proceeded to say, that 'they had inspected certain
depositions and papers remaining as of record in said circuit court, and to be used
as evidence, before the supreme court of the United States, on the trial of said
appeal.' Among the depositions, were the following:
'I, Richard Robert Madden, a British subject, having resided for the last three years and upwards, at Havana, where I have held official situations under the British government, depose and say, that I have held the office of superintendent of liberated Africans, during that term, and still hold it; and have held for the term of one year, the office there, of British commissioner, in the mixed court of justice. The duties of my office and of my avocation, have led me to become well acquainted with Africans recently imported from Africa. I have seen and had in my charge many hundreds of them. I have also seen the Africans in the custody of the marshal of the district of Connecticut, except the small children. I have examined them and observed their language, appearance and manners; and I have no doubt of their having been, very recently, brought from Africa. To one of them, I spoke, and repeated a Mohammedan form of prayer, in the Arabic language; the man immediately recognised the language, and repeated a few words of it, after me, and appeared to understand it, particularly the words 'Allah akbar,' or God is great. The man who was beside this negro, I also addressed in Arabic, saying, 'salaam alikoem,' or peace be to you; he immediately, in the customary oriental salutations, replied, ' alikoem salaam,' or peace be on you. From my knowledge of oriental habits, and of the appearance of the newly-imported slaves in Cuba, I have no doubt of those negroes of the Amistad being bon a fide Bozal negroes, quite newly imported from Africa I have a full knowledge of the subject of slavery-slave-trade in Cuba; and I know that no law exists, or has existed, since the year 1820, that sanctions the introduction of negroes into the island of Cuba, from Africa, for the purpose of making slaves, or being held in slavery; and that [40 U.S. 518, 534] all such Bozal negroes, as those recently imported are called, are legally free; and no law, common or statute, exists there, by which they can be held in slavery. Such Africans, long settled in Cuba, and acclimated, are called ladinos, and must have been introduced before 1820, and are so called, in contradistinction to the term creole, which is applied to the negroes born in the island. I have seen, and now have before me, a document, dated 26th June 1839, purporting to be signed by Ezpeleta, who is captain-general of the island, to identify which, I have put my name to the left-hand corner of the document, in presence of the counsel of the Africans; this document, or 'traspasso,' purporting to be a permit granted to Don I. Ruiz, to export from Havana to Puerto Principe, forty-nine negroes, designated by Spanish names, and called therein ladinos, a term totally inapplicable to newly-imported Africans. I have seen, and now have before me, another document, dated 22d June 1839, and signed in the same manner, granted to Don Pedro Montez, for the removal of three negro children from Havana to Puerto Principe, also designated by Spanish names, and likewise called 'ladinos,' and wholly inapplicable to young African children, who could not have been acclimated, and long settled in the island; which document, I have identified in the same manner as the former. To have obtained these documents from the governor, for bon a fide Bozal negroes, and have described them in the application for it, as ladinos, was evidently a fraud; but nothing more than such an application and the payment of the necessary fees would be required to procure it, as there is never any inquiry or inspection of the negroes, on the part of the governor, or his officer, nor is there any oath required from the applicant. I further state that the above documents are manifestly inapplicable to the Africans of the Amistad I have seen here and in New Haven; but such documents are commonly obtained by similar applications at the Havana, and by these means, the negroes recently and illegally introduced, are thus removed to the different ports of the island, and the danger obviated of their falling in with English cruisers, and then they are illegally carried into slavery. One of the largest dealers and importers of the island of Cuba, in African slaves, is the notorious house of Martines & Co., of Havana; and for years past, as at present, they have [40 U.S. 518, 535] been deeply engaged in this traffic; and the Bozal Africans, imported by these and all other slave-traders, when brought to the Havana, are immediately taken to the barracoons, or slave-marts; five of which are situated in the immediate vicinity of the governor's county house, about one mile and a half from the walls of Havana; and from these barracoons, they are taken and removed to the different parts of the island, when sold; and having examined the indorsements on the back of the traspasso, or permits for the removal of the said negroes of the Amistad, the signature to that indorsement appears to be that of Martines & Co.; and the document purports to be a permit or pass for the removal of the said negroes. The handwriting of Martines & Co., I am not acquainted with. These barracoons, outside the city walls, are fitted up exclusively for the reception and sale of Bozal negroes; one of these barracoons or slave-marts, called la miserecordia, or 'mercy,' kept by a man, named Riera, I visited the 24th September last, in company with a person well acquainted with this establishment; and the factor or major domo of the master, in the absence of the latter, said to me, that the negroes of the Amistad had been purchased there; that he knew them well; that they had been bought by a man from Puerto Principe, and had been embarked for that place; and speaking of the said negroes, he said, 'che lastima,' or what pity it is, which rather surprised me; the man further explained himself, and said, his regret was for the loss of so many valuable Bozals, in the event of their being emancipated in the United States. One of the houses most openly engaged and notoriously implicated in the slave-trade transactions, is that of Martines & Co.; and their practice is, to remove their newly-arrived negroes from the slave ships to these barracoons, where they commonly remain two or three weeks, before sold, as these negroes of the Amistad, illegally introduced by Martines & Co., were, in the present instance, as is generally reported and believed in the Havana. Of the Africans which I have seen and examined, from the necessity which my office imposes on me at the Havana,of assisting at the registry of the newly-imported Bozals, emancipated by the mixed court, I can speak with tolerable certainty of the ages of these people, with the exception of the children, whom [40 U.S. 518, 536] have not seen. Sa, about 17; Ba, 21; Luckawa, 19;Tussi, 30; Beli, 18; Shuma, 26; Nama, 20; Tenquis, 21; the others, I had not time to take a note of their ages. With respect to the mixed commission, its jurisdiction extends only to cases of captured negroes brought in by British or Spanish cruisers; and notwithstanding the illegalities of the traffic in slaves, from twenty to twenty-five thousand slaves have been introduced into the island, during the last three years; and such is the state of society, and of the administration of the laws there, that hopeless slavery is the inevitable result of their removal into the interior.'
On his cross-examination, the witness stated, that he was not acquainted with
the dialects of the African tribes, but was slightly acquainted with the Arabic language.
Lawful slaves of the island are not offered for sale generally, nor often placed
in the barracoons, or man-marts. The practice in Havana is to use the barracoons
'for Bozal negroes only.' Barracoons are used for negroes recently imported, and
for their reception and sale. The native language of the Africans is not often continued
for a long time, on certain plantations. 'It has been to me a matter of astonishment,
at the shortness of time in which the language of the negroes is disused, and the
Spanish language adopted and acquired. I speak this, from a very intimate knowledge
of the condition of the negroes in Cuba, from frequent visits to plantations, and
journeys in the interior; and on this subject, I think I can say, my knowledge is
as full as any person's can be.' 'There are five or six barracoons within pistol-shot
of the country residence of the captain-general of Cuba. On every other part of the
coast where the slave-trade is carried on, a barracoon or barracoons must likewise
exist. They are a part of the things necessary to the slave-trade, and are for its
use only, for instance, near Matanzas, there is a building or shed of this kind and
used for this purpose. Any negroes landed in the island since 1820, and carried into
slavery, have been illegally introduced; and the transfer of them under false names,
such as calling Bozal, ladinos, is, necessarily, a fraud. Unfortunately, there is
no interference on the part of the local authorities; they connive at it, and collude
with the slave-traders; the governor alone, at the Havana, receiving a [40 U.S.
518, 537] bounty or impost on each negro thus illegally introduced, of $10 a
head. As to the mixed commission, once the negroes clandestinely introduced are landed,
they no longer have cognisance of the violation of the treaty; the governor has cognisance
of this and every other bearing of the Spanish law, on Spanish soil. This head-money
has not the sanction of any Spanish law for its imposition; and the proof of this
is, it is called a voluntary contribution.'
Also, a statement, given by the district-attorney, W. S. Holabird, Esq., of what
was made to him by A. G. Vega, Esq., Spanish consul, January 10th, 1840: 'That he
is a Spanish subject; that he resided in the island of Cuba several years; that he
knows the laws of that island on the subject of slavery; that there was no law that
was considered in force in the island of Cuba, that prohibited the bringing in African
slaves; that the court of mixed commissioners had no jurisdiction, except in cases
of capture on the sea; that newly-imported African negroes were constantly brought
to the island, and after landing, were bon a, fide transferred from one owner to
another, without any interference by the local authorities or the mixed commission,
and were held by the owners, and recognised as lawful property; that slavery was
recognised in Cuba, by all the laws that were considered in force there; that the
native language of the slaves was kept up on some plantations, for years. That the
barracoons are public markets, where all descriptions of slaves are sold and bought;
that the papers of the Amistad are genuine, and are in the usual form; that it was
not necessary to practise any fraud, to obtain such papers from the proper officers
of the government; that none of the papers of the Amistad are signed by Martines,
spoken of by R. R. Madden in his deposition; that he (Martines) did not hold the
office from whence that paper issued.'
Also, a deposition of James Ray, a mariner on board of the Washington, stating the
circumstances of the taking possession of the Amistad, and the Africans, which supported
the allegations in the several libels, in all essential circumstances.
The documents exhibited as the passports of the Spanish authorities at Havana, and
other papers relating to the Amistad, and her clearance from Havana, were also annexed
to the decree of the circuit court, in the original Spanish. Translations of all
[40 U.S. 518, 538] of these which were deemed of importance in the cause,
are given in the decree of the district court.
Sullivan Haley stated in his deposition, that he heard Ruiz say, that 'none of the
negroes could speak Spanish; they are just from Africa.'
James Covey, a colored man, deposed, that 'he was born at Berong-Mendi country; left
there seven and a half years ago; was a slave, and carried to Lumboko. All these
Africans were from Africa. Never saw them until now. I could talk with them. They
appeared glad, because they could speak the same language. I could understand all
but two or three. They say, they from Lumboko; three moons. They all have Mendi names,
and their names all mean something; Carle, means bone; Kimbo, means cricket. They
speak of rivers which I know; said they sailed from Lumboko; two or three speak different
language from the others; the Timone language. Say-ang-wa rivers spoken of; these
run through the Vi country. I learned to speak English, at Sierre Leone. Was put
on board a man-of-war, one year and a half. They all agree as to where they sailed
form. I have no doubt they are Africans. I have been in this country six months;
came in a British man-of-war; have been in this town (New Haven) four months, with
Mr. Bishop; he calls on me for no money, and do not know who pays my board. I was
stolen by a black man, who stole ten of us. One man carried us two months' walk.
Have conversed with Sinqua; Barton has been in my town, Gorang. I was sailing for
Havana, when the British man-of-war captured us.' The testimony of Cinque and the
negroes of the Amistad, supported the statements in their answers.
The respondents also gave in evidence the 'treaty between Great Britain and Spain,
for the abolition of the slave-trade, signed at Madrid, 23d September 1817.'
The case was argued, for the United States, by Gilpin, Attorney- General; and by
Baldwin and Adams, for the appellees; Jones, on the part of Lieutenant Gedney and
others, of the United States brig Washington, was not required by the court to argue
the claims to salvage. [40 U.S. 518, 539] Gilpin, Attorney-General, for the
United States, reviewed the evidence, as set out in the record, of all the facts
connected with the case, from the first clearance of the schooner Amistad, at Havana,
on the 18th May 1838, down to the 23d January 1840, when the final decree of the
district court of the United States for the district of Connecticut, was rendered.
The attorney-general proceeded to remark, that on the 23d January 1840, the case
stood thus: The vessel, cargo and negroes were in possession of the marshal, under
process from the district court, to answer to five separate claims; those of Lieutenant
Gedney, and Messrs. Green & Fordham for salvage; that of the United States, at
the instance of the Spanish minister, for the vessel, cargo and negroes, to be restored
to the Spanish owners, in which claim those of Messrs. Ruiz and Montez were merged;
that of the Spanish vice-consul, for the slave Antonio, to be restored to the Spanish
owner; and that of Messrs. Tellincas, and Aspe and Laca, for the restoration of a
part of the cargo belonging to them. The decree of the district court found, that
the vessel and the goods on board, were the property of the Spanish subjects, and
that the passports under which the negroes were shipped at Havana, were signed by
the governor- general of Cuba. It denied the claims of Lieutenant Gedney, and Messrs.
Green and Fordham, to salvage on the slaves, but allowed the claims of the officers
and crew of the Washington to salvage on the Amistad, and on the merchandize on board
of that vessel. It also decreed, that the residue of the goods, and the vessel, should
be delivered to the Spanish minister, to be restored to the Spanish owners; and that
the slave Antonio should be delivered to the Spanish vice-consul, for the same purpose.
As to the negroes, claimed by Ruiz and Montes, it dismissed the claims of those persons,
on the ground, that they were included under that of the minister of Spain. The libel
of the United States, claiming the delivery of the negroes to the Spanish minister,
was dismissed, on the ground, that they were not slaves, but were kidnapped and imported
into Cuba; and that at the time they were so imported, there was a law of Spain declaring
persons so imported to be free. The alternative prayer of the United States, claiming
the delivery of the negroes, to be transported to Africa, was granted.
As soon as this decree was made, an appeal was taken by the [40 U.S. 518, 540]
United States to the circuit court, from the whole of it, except so far as it related
d to Antonio. At the succeeding term of the circuit court, the negroes moved that
the appeal of the United States might be dismissed, on the ground, that they had
no interest in the negroes; and also, on the ground, that they had no right to prosecute
claims to property in behalf of subjects of the Queen of Spain. That motion, however,
was refused by the circuit court, which proceeded to affirm the decree of the district
court, on the libel of the United States. It is from this decree of the circuit court,
that the present appeal to the supreme court is prosecuted.
Was the decree of the circuit court correct? The state of the facts, as found by
the decree, and not denied, was this: The vessel and the goods on board, were the
property of Spanish subjects, in Havana, on the 27th June 1839. At that time, slavery
was recognised and in existence in the Spanish dominions. The negroes in question
are certified, at that time, in a document signed by the governor-general of Cuba,
to be ladinos negroes- that is, slaves-the property of Spanish subjects. As such,
permission is given by the governor-general, to their owners, to take them by sea,
to Puerto Principe, in the same island. The vessel, with these slaves, thus certified,
on board, in charge of their alleged owners, regularly cleared and sailed from Havana,
the documentary evidence aforesaid, and the papers of the vessel being also on board.
During this voyage, the negroes rose, killed the master, and took possession of the
vessel. On the 26th August, the vessel, cargo and negroes were rescued and taken
on the high seas, by a public officer of the United States, and brought into a port
of the United States, where they await the decision of the judicial tribunals.
In this position of things, the minister of Spain demands that the vessel, cargo and negroes be restored, pursuant to the 9th article of the treaty of 27th October 1795, which provides (1 Laws U. S. 268), that 'all ships and merchandize of what nature soever, which shall be rescued out of the hands of any pirates or robbers, on the high seas, shall be brought into some port of either state, and shall be delivered into the custody of the officers of that port, in order to be taken care of and restored entire to the true proprietor, as soon as due [40 U.S. 518, 541] and sufficient proof shall be made concerning the property thereof.' The only inquiries, then, that present themselves, are: 1. Has 'due and sufficient proof concerning the property thereof' been made? 2. If so, have the United States a right to interpose in the manner they have done, to obtain its restoration to the Spanish owners? If these inquiries result in the affirmative, then the decree of the circuit court was erroneous, and ought to be reversed.
I. It is submitted, that there has been due and sufficient proof concerning the property, to authorize its restoration. It is not denied, that, under the laws of Spain, negroes may be held as slaves, as completely as they are in any of the states of this Union; nor will it be denied, if duly proved to be such, they are subject to restoration, as much as other property, when coming under the provisions of this treaty. Now, these negroes are declared, by the certificates of the governor- general, to be slaves, and the property of the Spanish subjects therein named. That officer (1 White's New Rec. 369, 371; 8 Pet. 310) is the highest functionary of the government in Cuba; his public acts are the highest evidence of any facts stated by him, within the scope of his authority. It is within the scope of his authority, to declare what is property, and what are the rights of the subjects of Spain, within his jurisdiction, in regard to property.
Now, in the intercourse of nations, there is no rule better established than this, that full faith is to be given to such acts-to the authentic evidence of such acts. The question is not, whether the act is right or wrong; it is, whether the act has been done, and whether it is an act within the scope of the authority. We are to inquire only whether the power existed , and whether it was exercised, and how it was exercised; not whether it was rightly or wrongly exercised. The principle is universally admitted, that, wherever an authority is delegated to any public officer, to be exercised at his discretion, under his own judgment, and upon his own responsibility, the acts done in the appropriate exercise of that authority, are binding as to the subject-matter. Without such a rule, there could be no peace or comity among nations; all harmony, all mutual [40 U.S. 518, 542] respect, would be destroyed; the courts and tribunals of one country would become the judges of the local laws and property of others. Nor is it to be supposed, that so important a principle would not be recognised by courts of justice. They have held, that, whether the act of the foreign functionary be executive, legislative or judicial, it is, if exercised within its appropriate sphere, binding as to the subject-matter; and the authentic record of such act is full and complete evidence thereof. In the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 170, this court held, that a commission was conclusive evidence of an executive appointment; and that a party from whom it was withheld might obtain it through the process of a court, as being such evidence of his rights. In the case of Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 167, this court sustained the binding and sufficient character of a decision, made by a competent tribunal, and not reversed, whether that decision was in itself right or wrong. In the case of the United States v. Arredondo, 6 Ibid. 719, the whole doctrine on this subject is most forcibly stated. Indeed, nothing can be clearer than the principles thus laid down; nor can they apply more directly to any case than the present. Here is the authentic certificate or record of the highest officer known to the Spanish law, declaring, in terms, that these negroes are the property of the several Spanish subjects. We have it countersigned by another of the principal officers. We have it executed and delivered, as the express evidence of property, to these persons. It is exactly the same as that deemed sufficient for the vessel and for the cargo. Would it not have been complete and positive evidence in the island of Cuba? If so, the principle laid down by this court makes it such here.
But this general principle is strengthened by the particular circumstances of the case. Where property on board of a vessel is brought into a foreign port, the documentary evidence, whether it be a judicial decree, or the ship's papers, accompanied by possession, is the best evidence of ownership, and that to which courts of justice invariably look. In the case of Bernadi v. Motteux, Doug. 575, Lord MANSFIELD laid down the rule, that a decree of a foreign court was conclusive as to the right of property under it. In that of The Virgilantia, 1 Rob. 3, 11, the necessity or propriety of producing the ship's papers, as the first [40 U.S. 518, 543] evidence of her character and property, and of ascertaining her national character from her passport, is expressly recognised. In that of The Cosmopolite, 3 Rob. 269, the title of the claimant, who was a Dane, to the vessel, was a decree of a French court against an American vessel; the court refused to inquire into the circumstances of the condemnation, but held the decree sufficient evidence for them. In that of The Sarah, 3 Rob. 266, the captors of a prize applied to be allowed to give proof of the property being owned by persons other than those stated in the ship's documents, but it was refused. In that of The Henrick and Maria, 4 Rob. 43, the very question was made, whether the court would not look into the validity of a title, derived under a foreign court of admiralty, and it was refused.
These principles are fully sustained by our own courts. In the case of The Resolution, 2 Dall. 22-3, possession of property on board of a vessel is held to be presumptive evidence of ownership; and the ship's papers, bills of lading, and other documents, are pri a facie evidence of the facts they speak. It is in this evidence that vessels are generally acquitted or condemned. In that of The Ann Green, 1 Gallis. 281-84, it is laid down as the rule, that the first and proper evidence in prize cases is the ship's papers; and that only in cases of doubt, is further testimony to be received. The court there say, that as a general rule, they would pronounce for the inadmissibility of such further evidence. So, in that of The Diana, 2 Gallis. 97, the general rule laid down is, that no claim is to be admitted in opposition to the ship's papers; the exceptions stand upon very particular grounds. In that of Ohl v. Eagle Insurance Company, 4 Mason 172, parol evidence was held not to be admissible to contradict a ship's papers. In that of McGrath v. The Candelero, Bee 60, a decree of restitution in a foreign court of admiralty was held to be full evidence of the ownership, and such as was to be respected in all other countries. In that of Catlett v. Pacific Insurance Company, 1 Paine 612, the register was held to be conclusive evidence of the national character of the vessel; and a similar rule was held to exist in regard to a pass, in the case of Barker v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 8 Johns. 307.
Similar principles have been adopted in this court. [40 U.S. 518, 544] The decree of a foreign court of admiralty, on a question of blockade, was allowed in the case of Croudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch 434, to be contradicted in the court below; but this court reversed that decision, and held it to be conclusive. In that of The Mary, 9 Cranch 142, this court sustained the proof of property founded on the register, against a decree of a foreign court of admiralty. In that of The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227, the court look to the documentary evidence, as that to be relied on to prove ownership; and although the papers were not strictly correct, they still relied on them, in preference to further extraneous proof. Add to all this, the 12th article of the treaty which Spain (1 Laws U. S. 270) which makes passports and certificates evidence of property; and the principle may be regarded as established beyond a question, that the regular documents are the best and primary evidence in regard to all property on board of vessels. This is, indeed, especially the case, when they are merely coasting vessels, or such as are brought in on account of distress, shipwreck or other accident. The injustice of requiring further evidence in such cases, is too apparent, to need any argument on the subject. Nor is it a less settled rule of international law, that when a vessel puts in by reason of distress or any similar cause, she is not to be judged by the municipal law. The unjust results to which a different rule would lead are most apparent. Could we tolerate it, that if one of our own coasters was obliged to put into Cuba, and had regular coasting papers, the courts of that country should look beyond them, as to proof of property?
If this point be established, is there any difference between property in slaves and other property? They existed as property, at the time of the treaty, in, perhaps, every nation of the globe; they still exist as property in Spain and the United States; they can be demanded as property, in the states of this Union to which they fly, and where by the laws they would not, if domiciliated, be property. If, then, they are property, the rules laid down in regard to property extend to them. If they are found on board of a vessel, the evidence of property should be that which is recognised as the best in other cases of property-the vessel's papers, accompanied by possession. In the cases of The Louis, [40 U.S. 518, 545] 2 Dods. 238, slaves are treated of, by Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, in express terms, as property, and he directed that those taken unlawfully from a foreigner should be restored. In the case of The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 119, the decision in the case of The Louis is recognised, and the same principle was fully and completely aced upon. It was there conceded (10 Wheat. 124), that possession on board of a vessel was evidence of property. In the case of Johnson v. Tompkins, 1 Bald. 577, it was held, that, even where it was a question of freedom or slavery, the same rules of evidence prevailed as in other cases relative to the right of property. In the case of Choat v. Wright, 2 Dev. 289, a sale of a slave, accompanied by delivery, is valid, though there be no bill of sale. And it is well settled, that a title to them is vested by the statute of limitations, as in other cases of property. 5 Cranch 358, 361; 11 Wheat. 361. If, them, the same law exists in regard to property in slaves as in other things; and if documentary evidence, from the highest authority of the country where the property belonged, accompanied with possession, is produced; it follows, that the title to the ownership of this property is as complete as is required by law.
But it is said, that this evidence is insufficient, because it is, in point of fact, fraudulent and untrue. The ground of this assertion is, that the slaves were not property in Cuba, at the date of the document signed by the governor-general; because they had been lately introduced into that island from Africa, and persons so introduced were free. To this it is answered, that if it were so, this court will not look beyond the authentic evidence under the official certificate of the governor-general; that, if it would, there is not such evidence as this court can regard to be sufficient to overthrow the positive statement of that document; and that, if the evidence were even deemed sufficient to show the recent introduction of the negroes, it does not establish that they were free at the date of the certificate.
1. This court will not look behind the certificate of the governor- general. It does not appear to be alleged, that it is fraudulent in itself. It is found by the district court to have been signed by him, and countersigned by the officer of the customs. [40 U.S. 518, 546] It was issued by them, in the appropriate exercise of their functions. It resembles an American register or coasting license. Now, all the authorities that have been cited show, that these documents are received as the highest species of evidence, and that, even if there is error in the proceedings on which they are founded. The correction must be made from the tribunal from which it emanates. Where should we stop, if we were to refuse to give faith to the documents of public officers? All national intercourse, all commerce, must be at an end. If there is error in issuing these papers, the matter must be sent to the tribunals of Spain for correction.
2. But if this court will look behind this paper, is the evidence sufficient to contradict it? The official declaration to be contradicted is certainly of a character not to be lightly set aside in the courts of a foreign country. The question is not, as to the impression we may derive from the evidence; but how far is it sufficient to justify us in declaring a fact, in direct contradiction to such an official declaration. It is not evidence that could be received, according to the established admiralty practice. Seamen (1 Pet. Adm. 211) on board of a vessel cannot be witnesses for one another, in matters where they have a common interest. Again, the principal part of this evidence is not taken under oath. That of Dr. Madden, which is mainly relied upon, is chiefly hearsay; and is contradicted, in some its most essential particulars, by that of other witnesses. Would this court be justified, on evidence such as this, in setting aside the admitted certificate of the governor-general? Would such evidence, on one of our own courts, be deemed adequate to set aside a judicial proceeding, or an act of a public functionary, done in the due exercise of his office? How, then, can it be adequate to such an end, before the tribunals of a foreign country, when they pass upon the internal municipal acts of another government; and when the endeavor is made to set them aside, in a mater relating to their own property and people?
3. But admit this evidence to be competent and sufficient; admit these negroes were brought into Cuba, a few weeks before the certificate was given; still, were they not slaves, under the Spanish laws? It is not denied, that negroes imported from [40 U.S. 518, 547] Africa into Cuba, might be slaves. If they are not, it is on account of some special law or decree. Has such a law been produced in the present case? The first document produced is the treaty with England, of 23d September 1817. But that has no such effect. It promises, indeed, that Spain will take into consideration the means of preventing the slave-trade, and it points out those means, so far as the trade on the coast of Africa is concerned. But it carefully limits the ascertainment of any infringement to two special tribunals, one at Sierra Leone, and the other at Havana. The next is the decree of December 1817, which authorizes negroes, brought in against the treaty, to 'be declared free.' The treaty of 28th June 1835, which is next adduced, is confined entirely to the slave-trade on the coast of Africa, or the voyage from there. Now, it is evident, that none of these documents show that these negroes were free in Cuba. They had not been 'declared free,' by any competent tribunal. Even had they been taken actually on board of a vessel engaged in the slave- trade, they must have been adjudicated upon at one of the two special courts, and nowhere else. Can this court, then, undertake to decide this question of property, when it has not even been decided by the Spanish courts; and make such decision, in the face of the certificate of the highest functionary of the island?
It is submitted, then, that if is this court does go behind the certificate of the governor-general, and look into the fact, whether or not these persons were slaves on the 18th June 1839, yet there is no sufficient evidence on which they could adjudge it to untrue. If this be so, the proof concerning the property is sufficient to bring the case within the intention and provisions of the treaty.
Continued in Part II, U.S. Supreme Court Decision in the Amistad Case
