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Adams, John Quincy. Argument Before the Supreme Court of the United States in the Case of the United States, Appellants, vs. Cinque and Other Africans Captured in the Schooner Amistad (Delivered 24 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1841). New York: S. W. Benedict, 1841.
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ARGUMENT
OF
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
IN THE CASE OF THE
UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS,
vs.
CINQUE, AND OTHERS, AFRICANS,
CAPTURED IN THE SCHOONER AMISTAD, BY LIEUT. GEDNEY,
DELIVERED ON THE 24th OF FEBRUARY AND lst OF MARCH, 1841.
WITH A REVIEW OF THE CASE OF THE ANTELOPE,
REPORTED IN THE 10th, 11th and 12th VOLUMES OF WHEATON'S REPORTS.
____________
NEW YORK: S.W. BENEDICT, 128 FULTON STREET
1841.
_____________________
II
I have now, may it please the Court, examined at great length, and with tedious detail,
the letter of the Spanish minister demanding the interposition of the national Executive
to restore these unfortunate Africans to the island of Cuba. And now I may inquire
of your Honors, what, in your opinion, was the duty of the Secretary of State, on
receiving such a letter. And in the first place, what did he do?
[27] Return to top
His first act was, to misrepresent the demand, and to write to the District Attorney in Connecticut, directing him to pursue a claim for the possession of these people on behalf of the United States, on the ground that the Spanish minister had demanded their delivery to him, as the property of Spanish subjects, and ordering him to take care that no court should place them beyond the control of the Executive. That is what he did. And the consequence is the case now before the court. The Attorney of the United States pursued his orders. He stated, in his claim before the District Court, that the Spanish minister had demanded their restoration as property; and then, as if conscious that this claim might not secure the other purpose, of keeping them at all events within the control of the Executive, he added, of his own head, (for it does not appear that he had any instructions on this point,) a second count, claiming, on behalf of the United States, that if the court should find they were not slaves by the laws of Spain, but that they were brought to our shores in violation of the act of Congress for the suppression of the slave trade, then they should be placed at the disposal of the President, to be sent to Africa, according to the provisions of that act. This count was undoubtedly added in consequence of the order not to let them be placed beyond the control of the Executive. In a subsequent term of the court, he filed a new libel, in which this alternative demand was omitted. Why was that done? I can conceive no other reason than that he had received such instructions from the Executive.
Those instructions do not appear among the printed documents, but it does not follow that none were given, for the communication of the President, in answer to the call of the House of Representatives, was not a full one, as I know of my own knowledge. The demand was for all information not incompatible with the public interest, and under that proviso many things were kept back. But there can be no doubt that it was for the purpose of complying with the first order of the District Attorney inserted in the second count, and that it was by the instructions of the department he afterward withdrew it.
[Mr.Baldwin. The count was not withdrawn. A new libel was entered, having only one count, but the first libel was not withdrawn.]
[28] Return to top
Very well—it amounts to this: that the Executive did not choose to hold itself responsible
for that construction of the act of Congress. This appears from the appeal. What
have the United States appealed from? Why, from a decree of the court, giving them
precisely what they had claimed by the District Attorney. The Attorney knew that
the libel grounded on the demand of the Spanish minister, (ostensibly, for I have
shown that it was a falsification of the terms of that demand by the Secretary of
State,) was not sufficient to place the Africans beyond the control of the Executive,
in a certain alternative, and therefore he calls upon the Court to put them in the
hands of the President, to be sent to Africa—that is, to complete their own voyage.
Well, the District Court investigated the case, and dissipated entirely the pretension
that these Africans could be claimed in any way as merchandise. They went the length
of declaring that the only ladino on board the boy Antonio, concerning whom there
was the slightest pretext of a claim that he was a slave, should be delivered up
to the Spanish consul, on behalf of the representatives of his late owner, Captain
Ferrer. The United States do not appeal from that decision, and there has been no
appeal, although we might have appealed with propriety. And I confess that, had I
been of counsel in that stage of the proceedings, I should have been much disposed
to appeal, on the ground that there was no article of the treaty which has any thing
to do with the case. I conceive that this part of the decree of the District Court
is not warranted by any law or treaty whatever.
But I do not desire to argue that question now, for I perceive that the district
judge, in giving his decision, places it partly on the ground that the boy is desirous
of returning. And as volenti non fit injuria, I reconcile my mind to
that part of the decision, for we could certainly have no possible motive to interfere
with the wishes of the boy. If he really has the desire to return to slavery in Cuba,
it would be far from my desire to interfere with his wishes, however strange and
unnatural I might deem them to be. But I must, at the same time, as an individual,
protest against his delivery by any compulsion, or on any ground of obligation in
the treaty; for I must maintain, that there is no one of the articles in the treaty
cited that has any application whatever to the case.
[29] Return to top
And now, may it please your Honors, so strange and singular is every thing that
happens, connected with this most singular case, I am informed that, after all, this
boy has not been sent to Cuba, notwithstanding his anxiety to go, and the desire
of the Spanish consul for his restoration, with a decree of the Court agreeable to
his demand. I am informed that he has remained a whole year in prison with the Africans,
and is, at this moment, in the custody of the marshal, by what warrant or process
I know not, or at whose expense.
The reason for this extended analysis of the demand by the Spanish minister is, that
we may be prepared to inquire what answer he ought to have received from the American
Secretary. I aver, that it was the duty of the Secretary of State instantly to answer
the letter, by showing the Spanish minister that all his demands were utterly inadmissible,
and that the government of the United States could do nothing of what he required.
It could not deliver the ship to the owner, and there was no duty resting on the
United States to dispose of the vessel in any such manner. And as to the demand that
no salvage should be taken, the Spanish minister should have been told that it was
a question depending exclusively on the determination of the courts, before whom
the case was pending for trial according to law. And the Secretary ought to have
shown Mr. Calderon, that the demand for a proclamation by the President of the United
States, against the jurisdiction of the courts, was not only inadmissible but offensive--it
was demanding what the Executive could not do, by the constitution. It would be the
assumption of a control over the judiciary by the President, which would overthrow
the whole fabric of the constitution; it would violate the principles of our government
generally and in every particular; it would be against the rights of the negroes,
of the citizens, and of the States.
The Secretary ought to have done this at once, without waiting to consult the President,
who was then absent from the city. The claim that the negroes should be delivered
was equally inadmissible with the rest; the President has no power to arrest either
citizens or foreigners. But even that power is almost insignificant compared with
that of sending men beyond seas to deliver them up to a foreign government. The Secretary
should have called upon the Spanish ambassador to name an instance where such a demand
had been made by any government of another government that was independent. He should
have told him, that such a demand was treating the President of the United States,
not as the head of a nation, but as a constable, a catchpole—-a character that it
is not possible to express in gentlemanly language. That is what this demand makes
of the President of the United States.
[30] Return to top
The Secretary should also have set the Spanish Minister right with regard to the
authorities before whom the question was pending. He should have told him that they
were not the authorities of the state of Connecticut but of the United States, the
courts of the Union in the state of Connecticut. He should have corrected this mistake
of the minister at the beginning. It was a real misapprehension, which has continued
through the whole proceeding to the present time, and it ought to have been corrected
at first. And what is still more remarkable, the same mistake of calling it the court
of Connecticut was made by Mr. Forsyth himself long after.
But what did the Secretary do in fact? He barely replies to Mr. Calderon, that he
had sent his letter to the President for his consideration, and that "no time
will be needlessly lost, after his decision upon the demand it prefers shall have
reached me, in communicating to you his views upon the subject."
And now, from that day to this, the Secretary of State has never answered one of
these demands, nor arrested one of these misapprehensions, nor asserted the rights
and the honor of the nation against one of these most extraordinary, inadmissible,
and insolent demands. He has degraded the country, in the face of the whole civilized
world, not only by allowing these demands to remain unanswered, but by proceeding,
I am obliged to say, throughout the whole transaction, as if the Executive were earnestly
desirous to comply with every one of the demands. In the very misrepresentations
of those demands, in his instructions to the District Attorney, under which this
case is brought here, why does he take such a course? The Spanish Minister pronounced
the Court before which the Secretary brought the question, an incompetent tribunal—and
this position has been maintained by the Legation of Spain down to this very month,
that a letter of Chevalier d'Argaiz officially protests against the jurisdiction
of the courts before which the Secretary professes to be prosecuting the claim of
this very minister!
[31] Return to top
Why does the Spanish Minister persist in such inadmissible pretensions? It is because
they were not met in limine in a proper manner—-because he was not told instantly,
without the delay of an hour, that this Government could never admit such claims,
and would be offended if they were repeated, or any portion of them. Yet all these
claims, monstrous, absurd and inadmissible as they are, have been urged and repeated
for eighteen mouths, upon our Government, and an American Secretary of State evades
answering any of them—-evades it to such an extent that the Spanish Minister reproaches
him for not meeting his arguments.
The demand of Mr. Calderon was dated September 6. The order of the Secretary to the
District Attorney, in regard to the suit, was dated September 11, in which he says
that "a communication has been addressed to this department by the Minister
of Her Catholic Majesty, CLAIMING THE VESSEL, CARGO, AND BLACKS ON BOARD, AS SPANISH
PROPERTY, and demanding its immediate release. On the 23d of September, the Secretary
writes to the Spanish Minister as follows:
Sir: In the examination of the case of the Spanish schooner "Amistad,"
the only evidence at present within reach of this department is that presented by
the ship's paper; and the proceedings of the court of inquiry held by a district
judge of Connecticut, on board the schooner, at the time the negroes in whose possession
she was found, were imprisoned for the alleged murder of the captain and mate of
the vessel. If you have any other authentic documents relating to the question or
evidence of facts which can be useful to a proper understanding of it, I have the
honor to request by the direction of the President, that you will communicate them
to me with as little delay as practicable.
Here the Secretary reiterates the error of the Spanish minister, instead of correcting
it, with regard to the character of the Court before which the case was pending.
The Secretary of State calls the United States District Court for Connecticut "a
District Court of Connecticut." The Spanish Minister could not be expected
to acquire a correct understanding of the case, unless he was informed but here he
has his error confirmed.
The Secretary further requests the ambassador, if he has any farther documents, "that
you will communicate them to me." What had he to do with this evidence?
The Spanish minister had made a certain demand upon the government of the United
States. Whether it was what it appears to be, or whether it was what the Secretary
represented it to be in his orders to the District Attorney,
[32] Return to top
it was no part of the business of the American Secretary of State to look after
the evidence. Still, if he had requested the minister to communicate the evidence
to the Court, it might not have been exactly improper, but only officious. If the
Spanish Minister chose to go into our courts in support of the private claims of
Spanish subjects, he could do it, and it was his business to bring forward the proper
evidence in support of his claim. Why, then, does the Secretary call upon him to
furnish these documents to the Executive Department? Your Honors will judge whether
this letter is or is not evidence of a determination then existing on the part of
the Executive, to decide this case independently of the judiciary, and ex parte.
Mr. Calderon replies that he has no other evidence to furnish. The next document
is the letter of his successor, the Chevalier d'Argaiz:
NEW YORK, October 3, 1839.
The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Her Catholic
Majesty, has the honor of commencing his official correspondence with you, sir, by
soliciting an act of justice, which, not being in any way connected with the principal
question as yet remaining
unsettled by the cabinet, relative to the negroes found on board the schooner Amistad
on her arrival on these coasts, he does not doubt will be received by you in the
manner which he
has every reason to expect, from the circumstance that all preceding acts of the
department under your charge have been dictated by the principles of rectitude and
reciprocity.
Her Majesty's vice-consul at Boston, under date of the 24th of September last, says,
among other things:
"As it appears from the papers of the schooner that she, as well as her cargo,
are exclusively Spanish property, it seems strange that the Court of New London has
not yet ordered the delivery of one or both to the owners, if they are present, or
to me, as their agent born in that part of the Union"—[This is a mistranslation;
it means the official agent in that part of the Union]— "agreeably to the articles
of the treaty now in force between the two countries. The delay in the delivery would
not be of so much consequence to the proprietors if the vessel did not require immediate
repairs, in order to preserve her from complete destruction, and if it were not material
that a large part of the cargo should be sold on account of its bad condition.
[33] Return to top
Here we see the same unfortunate misapprehension continued. The new Spanish minister
calls upon the Secretary of State to put the "Court of New London" into
speedy action, to lessen the danger loss to the proprietors by delay, and the Secretary
of State takes no pains to correct the error.
On the 24th of October, the Secretary of State wrote again to Mr. Argaiz, on another
subject, which is not now before this Court,—-the arrest of Ruiz and Montes, at the
suit of some of the Africans, in the courts of the State of New York. Mr. Argaiz
protested against the arrest, and claims "the interposition of the Executive
in procuring their liberation, and indemnity for the losses and injury they may have
sustained." To that the Secretary replies:
"It appears from the documents accompanying the note of the Chevalier d'Argaiz,
that the two Spanish subjects referred to were arrested on process issuing from the
Superior Court of the city of New York, at the suit of, and upon affidavits made
by certain colored men, natives of Africa, for the purpose of securing their appearance
before the proper tribunal, to answer for wrongs alleged to have been inflicted by
them upon the persons of the said Africans; and, consequently, that the occurrence
constitutes a simple case of resort by individuals against others to the judicial
courts of the country, which are equally open to all without distinction, and to
which it belongs exclusively to decide, as well upon the right of the complainant
to demand the interposition of their authority, as upon the liability of the defendant
to give redress for the wrong alleged to have been committed by him. This being the
only light in which the subject can be viewed, and the constitution and laws having
secured the judicial power against all interference on the part of the Executive
authority, the President, to whom the Chevalier d'Argaiz's note has been communicated,
has instructed the undersigned to state, that the agency of this government to obtain
the release of Messrs. Ruiz and Montes cannot be afforded in the manner requested
by him. The laws of the state of New York, of which the constitution and laws of
the United States and their treaties with foreign powers form a part, afford to Messrs
Ruiz and Montes all the necessary means to procure their release from imprisonment,
and to obtain any indemnity to which they may be justly entitled, and therefore would
render unnecessary any agency on the part of this department for those purposes."
[34] Return to top
There is complete answer to all these demands of the Spanish legation. "The
constitution and laws have secured the judicial power against ALL interference of
the Executive authority." That is very true. The laws of the state of New York,
of which the constitution and laws of the United States and their treaties with foreign
powers form a part, afford to Messrs. Ruiz and Montes all the necessary means for
the security of their rights, and therefore "render unnecessary any agency on
the part of" the Executive. That is very correct. There is a perfect answer,
worthy of an American statesman But is that all? No. The Secretary finds, after all
these disclaimers, one Executive power yet in reserve, which may be put forth to
take part against poor Africans, and at least afford evidence of the national sympathy.
The Secretary says:
" But inasmuch as the imprisonment of those persons connects itself with another
occurrence which has been brought under the President's consideration, in consequence
of a correspondence between the Spanish legation and this department, instructions
(of which a copy is inclosed) have been given to the Attorney of the United States
for the District of New York to put himself in communication with those gentlemen,
to other them his advice (and his aid, if necessary) as to any measure which it may
be proper for them to adopt to procure their release, and such indemnity as may be
due to them, under our laws, for their arrest and detention."
Because the case "connects itself with another occurrence." What is all
this? The independence of the judiciary is first firmly and bravely sustained. It
is a question of private rights between parties, with which the executive has nothing
to do, and the Government of the United States has no power to interpose. And then
the President instructs the District Attorney, the law officer of the government,
to "put himself in communication" with one of the parties, to throw all
the weight and influence of the government on their side, in order to secure a favorable
decision for them in the Courts of the state of New York. May it please your Honors,
I will not here enter into an inquiry of the effect of this interference of the Executive
of the United States with the Courts of a State, or the extent and operation of the
principle which would authorize such interference. I really do not know, my imagination
cannot present to me the compass of its effects on the rights of the people of the
United States. I again ask the attention of this honorable court to this subject.
The letter begins with a declaration of the independence of the judiciary of the
State of New York, the sufficiency of the laws to secure justice and the incompetency
of the Executive to interfere; and yet, because the case "connects itself"
with another case in which the Executive has considered itself entitled to act, the
whole influence of the Government is brought to bear upon the judicial authorities
of the State of New York.
[35] Return to top
I said the Secretary of State had never to this hour undertaken to contest any
one of the actual demands of Mr. Calderon, as preferred in his letter of 5th September.
He had suffered both Mr. Calderon and his successor to remain under the impression
that if their demands were not complied with, for the kidnapping of these people
by the Executive, it was not for the want of a will to do it, or of a disposition
to contest the claims put forth in so extraordinary a manner upon our government.
Let us now see how Mr. Argaiz himself regarded the conduct of the Secretary. On the
5th of November, he writes again to Mr. Forsyth, acknowledging the receipt of Mr.
Forsyth's letter, inclosing the instructions of the Attorney of the United States
for the District of New York, "that he should offer to these persons his advice
and assistance, if needed, with regard to the most proper means of obtaining their
liberty." He says:
"Although this answer did not entirely satisfy the desire expressed by the undersigned
in the note of October 22d, to which he was impelled by the sense of his duty, and
by the terms of existing treaties, yet he received it with pleasure and with thanks;
with pleasure, because he saw that the Secretary of State did not refuse to admit
the reasons which the undersigned had the honor to state in that note; and with thanks,
because he saw that the sentiments which had urged him to request with warmth a prompt
reply, had been kindly interpreted. The undersigned in consequence, went immediately
to New York, where he visited, on the 29th ultimo, the Attorney of the United States;
with whom he had a long conversation, which left him delighted with the affability
and courtesy of Mr. Butler, although he did not have the happiness to remain satisfied
as to the principal matter, as that officer of justice declared that he could find
no other means of obtaining the liberty of Ruiz (Montes being already free) than
by waiting determination of the court or courts, against the jurist diction of which
the undersigned had already especially protested."
[36] Return to top
The Spanish ambassador was not satisfied with the letter, and and yet he received
it with pleasure, "because he saw that the Secretary did not refuse to admit
his reasons." How is that? The Secretary of State took no measures to repel
the improper demand made, or to correct the erroneous idea cherished by the Spanish
legation; and this neglect Mr. Argaiz construes as a virtual admission of his "reasons."
Why should he not so construe it? Here is also a renewal of the protest, which has
uniformly been maintained by the legation, against the right of any court in this
country to exercise jurisdiction in the case. And yet this suit is carried on by
the Executive, as in pursuance of a demand by the Spanish minister. Mr. Argaiz then
refers to two personal conferences which he had with the Secretary, and he is well
persuaded that what he had said, together with the indications in his note of October
22, would have been sufficient to convince " one so enlightened and discriminating
as the Secretary, of the justice of his claim; that this persuasion has gained strength
from the circumstance that the Secretary of State has made no attempt in his answer
to oppose those arguments, but has confined himself to endeavoring to explain
the course of civil causes in the courts of this country, in order to show that the
government of the United States could not interfere in the manner which her Catholic
Majesty's representative requested; it becomes necessary to advance farther arguments,
at the risk of being importunate."
And a little farther on, after adverting to the various excuses and palliations which
seem to have been presented in these confidential conferences, for not seizing these
negroes and sending them to Cuba by the Executive power, in which he says "it
is allowed by the whole world" that "petitions or accusations of slaves
against their masters cannot be admitted in a court," he concludes by asking--
"As the incompetence of the courts of the United States, with regard to this
matter, is so clearly demonstrated, is there no power in the Federal Government to
declare it so, and to interpose its authority to put down the irregularity of these
proceedings, which the court is not competent to perform? It seems impossible that
there should be no such power; but unfortunately there is none.
[37] Return to top
"Her Catholic Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, nevertheless,
seeing that his previous protest did not produce the result which he expected, renews
it now, declaring this government responsible for the consequences which may grow
out of this affair; and he asks the Secretary of State whether or not he possesses
sufficient authority and force to carry into fulfillment the treaty of 1795. If he
has not, then there can be no treaty binding on the other party."
He thinks it impossible there should not be a power in the Federal Government to
put down these proceedings of the courts, but he admits that unfortunately there
is no such power, and then asks the Secretary of State if he cannot find a power
, somewhere, to take the matter out of the hands of the judiciary altogether.
And if not, he shall hold this Government responsible for the consequences, for if
it has not power to fulfill the treaty, no treaty is binding on either party.
On the 26th of November, the trial of the case having been postponed by the District
Court from November to January, he writes again, that he is under the necessity of
renewing his former complaints.
"To the first complaint made by his predecessor, on the 6th September last,
nothing more than an acknowledgment of its receipt was thought necessary, which was
made on the 16th of the same month. In the answers which the Secretary was pleased
to give to the notes of the undersigned, of the 22d of October, and the 5th of November
last, that gentleman did not think proper to combat the arguments advanced.
Those which the undersigned now proposes to present will be no less powerful, and
he hopes will be such that the Secretary will not be able to deny their justice.
"The undersigned has the honor to ask in what law, act, or statute, does the
said court base its right to take cognizance of the present case? There can be no
doubt as to the reply: on no law, act, or statute."
Here he denies again that the Court, before which the Secretary of State had made
a demand with the averment that it came from the Spanish minister, has any power
to take cognizance of the case. He says there is no law, act, or statute for it,
and then he goes on:
[38] Return to top
"For, if any such existed, it is, or should be, anterior or posterior to the
treaty of 1795. If anterior, it clearly became annulled, because a treaty is one
of the superior laws of the State, or the treaty should never have been signed, or
ratified, or sanctioned by the legislative bodies. If posterior to the treaty, the
legislative bodies, in drawing it up, discussing it, and voting on it, must have
seen that it was at variance with a subsisting treaty, which was already a law of
the Union. All which serves to show that, in the existing state of the laws, this
affair cannot and should not be decided by the common law, but by the international
law."
That is to say, the treaty stipulation has taken away the power of the courts of
the United States to exercise jurisdiction between parties. Is that a doctrine to
be heard by the Secretary of State of the United States from a foreign ambassador
without answering it? The ambassador proceeds to urge that "if the General Government
of the Union had decided this matter of itself, gubernativamente"---here
is a word, used several times in this correspondence, that no American translator
has been able to translate into our language. It means, by the simple will or absolute
fiat of the Executive, as in the case of the lettres de cachet--or
a warrant for the BASTILLE--that is what the Spaniard means by gubernativamente,
when he asks the Executive of the United States, by his own fiat, to seize
these MEN, wrest them from the power and protection of the courts, and send them
beyond seas! Is there any such law at Constantinople? Does the Celestial Empire allow
a proceeding like this? Is the Khan of Tartary possessed of a power competent to
meet demands like these? I know not where on the globe we should look for any such
authority, unless it be with the Governor General of Cuba with respect to negroes.
"If the General Government kind proceeded gubernativamente" --it
is not necessary now to consider what would have followed. "But," says
the Chevalier d'Argaiz, "very different, however, have been the results; for,
in the first place the treaty of 1796 has not been executed, as the legation of her
Catholic Majesty has solicited; and the public vengeance has not been satisfied."
" The public vengeance!" What public vengeance? The vengeance of African
slave-traders, despoiled of their prey and thirsting for blood! The vengeance of
the barracoons! This "public vengeance" is not satisfied. Surely, this
is very lamentable. Surely, this is a complaint to be made to the Secretary of State
of this government. "For," "says he, "be it recollected that
the legation of Spain does not demand the delivery of slaves, but of assassins."
[39] Return to top
How is it possible to reconcile this declaration of the Spanish minister with the
libel of the District Attorney, entered by order of the Secretary of State, resting
forth what was said to be the demand of the Spanish minister? It is an explicit contradiction.
The Constitution of the United States recognizes the slaves, held within some of
the States of the Union, only in their capacity of persons--persons held to
labor or service in a State under the laws thereof--persons constituting elements
of representation in the popular branch of the National Legislature--persons,
the migration or importation of whom should not be prohibited by Congress prior to
the year 1808. The Constitution no where recognizes them as property. The words slave
and slavery are studiously excluded from the Constitution. Circumlocutions are the
fig leaves under which these parts of the body politic are decently concealed. Slaves,
therefore, in the Constitution of the United States are recognized only as persons,
enjoying rights and held to the performance of duties.
But, in all countries where men are held as slaves, when they are charged, with the
commission of crimes, the right of their owners to their persons is, and must necessarily
be, suspended; and when they are convicted of capital crimes, the right of the owner
is extinguished. Throughout the whole correspondence between the Spanish ministers
and our Department of State, concerning the surrender of these most unfortunate persons,
this broad distinction appears to have been entirely and astonishingly overlooked,
not only by the Spanish ministers, but by the Secretary of State and by the Attorney
General.
Mr. Calderon demands that the President should keep these persons all—all—adult
males and children of both sexes included--in close custody, and convey them to Cuba
to be tried for their lives. Is it not palpable that if this demand had been complied
with, they could not have been restored to their pretended owners, Ruiz and Montes,
as merchandise of what nature soever? With what face, then, could the 9th article
of the treaty with Spain be alleged to support a demand for the safekeeping and delivery
of the captives, not as slaves, but as assassins--not as merchandise, but
as men—as infant females, with flesh, and blood, and nerves, and sinews, to be tortured,
and with lives to be forfeited and consumed by fire, to appease the public vengeance
of the lawless slave-traders in Cuba?
[40] Return to top
Mr. Forsyth, by a most unaccountable oversight of this distinction between persons
and things, misrepresents this demand of Mr.Calderon.
He instructs the District Attorney, Mr. Holabird, (11th Sept., 1839, Doc. p. 39,
40,) that the Spanish minister had addressed a communication to the Department of
State, claiming the vessel, cargo, AND BLACKS on board, as Spanish property, and
demanding its immediate release.
The District Attorney, on the 19th of September, files, accordingly, his libels,
(Record, p. 13,) stating the demand of the Spanish minister, not as it had really
been made, but according to the statement of it in his instructions from the Department
of State; and he prays the Court that, if the claim of the Spanish minister is well
founded and conformable to treaty, the Court should make such order for the disposal
of the said vessel, cargo, AND SLAVES, as may best enable the United States, in all
respects, to comply with their treaty stipulations, and preserve the public faith
inviolate.
But if it should be made to appear that the persons aforesaid, described as slaves,
are negroes and persons of color, who have been transported from Africa in violation
of the laws of the United States, and brought into these United States contrary to
the same laws, he claims that, in such case, the Court shall make such further order
as may enable the United States, if deemed expedient, to remove such persons
to the coast of Africa, to be delivered there to such agent or agents as may be authorized
to receive and provide for them, pursuant to the laws of the United States; or to
make such other order as to the court should seem fit, right, and proper in the premises.
Here were three alternatives prayed for—-1st. That the vessel, cargo, and blacks,
assumed to be slaves, should be so disposed of as to enable the United States to
comply with their treaty stipulations, and preserve the public faith inviolate. It
was stated that this demand was made at the instance of the Spanish minister, but
that was true only of the vessel and cargo, but not of the persons. Of them, he had
demanded, by necessary implication, that they should not be restored to their
pretended owners, but kept in close custody, and, in defiance of all judicial
authority, conveyed to the Havana Governmentally, that is, by the arbitrary mandate
of the President of the United States, to satisfy public vengeance. The Court could
not have complied with this alternative of restoring the negroes, as property, to
their owners, but by denying and defying the real demand of the Spanish minister,
that they should be sent to Cuba as criminals.
[41] Return to top
The second alternative was, that the Court should enable the United States to send the negroes home to Africa, if deemed expedient; and to this the decree of the Court said, soit fait comme il est desire--be it as the District Attorney desires. Let the said Africans, in the custody of the Marshal, be delivered to the President of the United States by the Marshal of the District of Connecticut, to be by him transported to Africa, in pursuance of the law of Congress passed March 3, 1829, entitled "An act in addition to the acts prohibiting the slave-trade."
Yet, from this sentence, claimed by the District Attorney, the representative of
the Executive Administration before the Court, it is he himself that appeals. Should
the Court sustain that appeal, what judgment could they possibly render? Should they
reverse the decision of the District and Circuit Courts, they would indeed determine
that these forty persons should not be delivered to the President of the United States,
to be sent home to Africa; --but what shall the Court decree to be done with them?
Not, surely, that they should be delivered up to their pretended owners, for against
that the Spanish minister solemnly protests! He demands not even that they should
be delivered up to himself ! He demands that it should be declared, that no
tribunal in the United States has the right even to institute proceedings against
them. Be declared--by whom? He demands of the Executive Administration—-(will the
Court please to consider what the purport of this demand is?)—-that the President
of the United States should issue a proclamation that no tribunal of the United States
has the right to institute proceedings against the subjects of Spain for crimes
committed on board a Spanish vessel, and in the waters of the Spanish territory.
[42] Return to top
When this demand was made, the Africans of the Amistad were in the custody of a judicial tribunal of the United States, upon proceedings instituted against them as criminals charged with piracy and murder. They were also claimed by two Spaniards as merchandise, their property; and the faith of a treaty was solemnly invoked to sustain the claim that this merchandise, rescued out of the hands of pirates or robbers, (that is to say, out of the hands of itself,) should be taken care of by the officers of the port into which they had been brought, and restored entire to them—-Ruiz and Montes—-as soon as due and sufficient proof should be made concerning the property thereof.
Now, if no tribunal in the United States had the right to institute proceedings
against the subjects of Spain for crimes committed on board
a Spanish vessel and in the waters of the Spanish territory, how could the Court
know that these Spanish subjects were, at the same time, the merchandise rescued
out of the hands of pirates and robbers and the pirates or robbers out of whose hands
the merchandise was rescued? How could the Court know that they were subjects of
Spain—that they were pirates or robbers—or that they were merchandise—if the Court
had no right to institute proceedings against them?
The very phraseology of the 9th article of the treaty with Spain proves, that it
was not and could not be intended to include persons under the denomination
of merchandise, of what nature soever, for it provides that the merchandise shall
be delivered to the custody of the officers of the port, in order to be taken
care of and restored entire to the true proprietor. Now, this provision,
that the merchandise shall be restored entire, is absurd if applied to human
beings, and the use of the word conclusively proves that the thought and intention
of the parties could not be construed to extend to human beings. A stipulation to
restore human beings entire might suit two nations of cannibals, but would
be absurd, and worse than absurd, between civilized and Christian nations. Again,
the article provides that the rescued merchandise shall be delivered to the custody
of the officers-of the port into which it is brought, in order to be taken care
of; but, by what Constitution or law of the United States, or of Connecticut,
could the officers of the port of New London receive into their custody, and take
care of, the Africans of the Amistad?
[43] Return to top
The demand of the Spanish minister, Calderon, was, that the President of the United
States should first turn manrobber; rescue from the custody of the Court,
to which they had been committed, those forty odd Africans, males and females, adults
and children; next turn jailer, and keep them in his close custody, to prevent their
evasion; and lastly, turn catchpole and convey them to the Havana, to appease
the public vengeance of the African slave-traders of the barracoons.
Is it possible to speak of this demand in language of decency and moderation ? Is
there a law of Habeas Corpus in the land? Has the expunging process of black lines
passed upon these two Declarations of Independence in their gilded frames? Has the
4th of July, '76, become a day of ignominy and reproach? Is there a member of this
Honorable Court of age to remember the indignation raised against a former President
of the United States for causing to be delivered up, according to express treaty
stipulation, by regular judicial process, a British sailor, for murder on board of
a British frigate on the high seas? At least, all your Honors remember the case of
the Bambers? You all remember your own recent decision in the case of Dr. Holmes?
And is it for this Court to sanction such monstrous usurpation and Executive tyranny
as this at the demand of a Spanish minister? And can you hear, with judicial calmness
and composure, this demand of despotism, countenanced and supported by all the Executive
authorities of the United States, though not yet daring to carry it into execution?
The third alternative prayed for in the name and behalf of the United States in the
libel of the 19th of September, 1839, is, that the court should make such other order
in the premises as it should think fit, right, and proper.
To this expedient it was necessary for the court to resort. The court did not know—it
could not know that the demand of the Spanish Minister, Calderon, was not only widely
different from that which the libel of the District Attorney represented it to be,
but absolutely incompatible with it. The court took it for granted that the statement
in the libels, at least so far as concerned the demand of the Spanish Minister, was
true--and so far as respected the only Ladino on board the Amistad, the boy Antonio,
did accede to the supposed demand of the Minister--did actually admit the treaty
stipulation as applicable to him—and did decree that he should be restored to the
legal representatives of his deceased master. The judge of the District Court relieved
Antonio from his right of appeal from that decision by stating that Antonio himself
desired to be restored to his widowed mistress. But as the whole decree was the result
of a deception practiced upon the court, and as in that part of it relating to Antonio,
are involved principles of the deepest interest to human freedom, and to the liberties
of my country, I will only express my most earnest hope, with profound respect for
the court, that that portion of its decision will never be adduced as authority for
the surrender of any other individual situated as Antonio was on that trial.
[44] Return to top
And here I must avail myself of the occasion to state my objections to the admission of the case of the Antelope as an authoritative precedent in this or any other court of the United States--I had almost said for any thing, certainly for the right of the court itself to deliver up to slavery any human individual at the demand of any diplomatic or consular agent of any foreign power. And that I may be enabled to set forth at large, my reasons for resisting the application of that case as precedent or authority for the settlement of any principle now under the consideration of the Court, I must ask the permission of the Court to review the case of the Antelope itself, as it appears on the face of the Reports.
[See the review of the case of the Antelope, at the close of the argument.]
And this declaration of the Spanish minister not only contradicts it, but shows that
it was impossible any such demand should have been made. "For, let it be remembered,"
he says, "that the Spanish legation demands not slaves but assassins."
No despotism could comply with both demands, had they been made, but the Spanish
Minister explicitly declares that only one demand was made by the legation, and that
not the one affirmed by the Secretary of State—-not property but assassins--not
for the benefit of individuals, but to satisfy "public vengeance." There
is something follows in the letter about "fanaticism," which I will not
read to the Court, for reasons that will be obvious.** Indeed, I do not know
as I understand it, and it is possible that I have indulged, or may indulge in what,
in certain dialects, may be called "fanaticism," myself.
**It is proper to append this part of the letter, that the
allusion may be understood by the reader, as it doubtless was by the Court.—Reporter.
Very different, however, have been the results; for, in the first place the treaty of 1795 has not been executed, as the legation of her Catholic Majesty has solicited; and the public vengeance has not been satisfied; for be it recollected that the legation of Spain does not demand the delivery of slaves, but of assassins. Secondly, great injury has been done to the owners; not the least being the imprisonment which Don Jose Ruiz is now undergoing, notwithstanding the complaints made on that subject, which, if not entirely disregarded, have at least not produced the favorable results which might have been expected; and the dignity of the Spanish nation has thus been offended. With respect to which injuries, the undersigned will, on a proper occasion, use his right; although no indemnification can fully recompense for the evils, physical and moral, which the persecutions and vexations occasioned by fanaticism may cause to an honorable man."
[45] Return to top
The Chevalier proceeds to reason:
"Thus it appears that a court of one of the States of the confederacy has assumed
the direction of an affair over which it has no jurisdiction; that there can be no
law, either anterior or posterior to the treaty, upon which a legal sentence can
be based; that this court, by the repeated delays which it orders, contributes to
delay the satisfaction demanded by public justice; and that, in consequence, the
affair should only be determined by reference to international right, and, therefore,
by the exercise of the power of the Government, (gubernativamente;) that,
for its determination, the treaty exists to which Spain appeals; that, from the delay
on this determination have proceeded injuries requiring indemnification, to demand
which the undersigned reserves his right for a future occasion. The undersigned may,
without indiscretion, declare that this must be the opinion of the cabinet, which,
possessing already the necessary and even indispensable powers, may immediately act
(gubernativamente ) in this matter, in virtue of the actual state of the law,
and without awaiting the decision of any court. Not to do so may give rise to very
complicated explanations with regard to reciprocity in the execution and fulfillment
of treaties."
Here it is. "Gubernativamente," again; that is the idea which was
in the mind of the Spanish minister all the while, gubenativamente. That is
what he was insisting on, that was the demand which the Secretary of State never
repelled as he ought, by telling Mr. Argaiz that it was not only inadmissible under
our form of government, but would be offensive if repeated. But where will your Honors
find any thing like a demand for property, under the treaty, and by the decision
of a court of the United States? He says, if the Executive does not at once act gubernativamente,
and take the case out of the judiciary, and send these people to Cuba, it may give
rise to complicated explanations with regard to reciprocity in the execution and
fulfillment of treaties." Is that language for a foreign minister to use to
the American Secretary Of State, and not to be answered? He then says:
[46] Return to top
"The undersigned flatters himself with the hope that his Excellency the President
will take into his high consideration this communication, to which the undersigned
hopes for a speedy answer, as a new proof of the scrupulousness and respect with
which this nation fulfills the treaties existing with other nations. If, contrary
to this hope, the decision should not be such as the undersigned asks, he can only
declare the General Government of the Union responsible for all and every consequence
which the delay may produce."
There is the language used by the representative of her Catholic Majesty to the Secretary
of State of the United States, and to which the Secretary never thought it necessary
to make a suitable reply. There is another correspondence published among the documents
of the present session of Congress, connected too with this very case, which shows
that the Secretary knows how to be very sensitive with regard to any thing that looks
like foreign interference with the action of our courts and government. It is in
his answer to Mr. Fox, the British ambassador, who addressed a letter to Mr. Forsyth,
January 20th, 1841, saying he had been instructed to represent to the President that
the attention of his government "has been seriously directed to the case"
of these Africans, and in consequence of the treaty between Great Britain and Spain,
in which the former paid a valuable consideration for the abandonment of the trade,
it is "moved to take a special and peculiar interest in the fate of these unfortunate
Africans." And he says:
"Now the unfortunate Africans, whose case is the subject of the present representation,
have been thrown by accidental circumstances into the hands of the authorities of
the United States; and it may probably depend upon the action of the United States
Government, whether these persons shall recover the freedom to which they are entitled,
or whether they shall be reduced to slavery, in violation of the known laws and contracts
publicly passed, prohibiting the continuance of the African slave trade by Spanish
subjects.
"It is under these circumstances that Her Majesty's Government anxiously hope
that the President of the United States will find himself empowered to take such
measures in behalf of the aforesaid Africans as shall secure to them the possession
of their liberty, to which, without doubt, they are by law entitled."
[47] Return to top
The Secretary of State, in his reply, consents to receive the communication,"
as an evidence of the benevolence of her Majesty's Government, under which
aspect alone," he says, "it could be entertained by the Government
of the United States." What a different tone is here! Mr. Fox merely referred
to the relations of his own government with that of Spain, and to the 10th article
of the treaty of Ghent, between Great Britain and the United States, in which both
nations bound themselves "to use their best endeavors for the entire abolition
of the African slave trade." His letter was courteously worded throughout. It
casts no imputations upon any branch of our government, it pronounces no part of
it incompetent to its functions, it asks no unconstitutional and despotic interference
of the Executive with the judiciary gubernativamete, but simply announces
the interest his government feels in the case, and its "anxious hope
that the President of the United States will find himself empowered to take such
measures in behalf of the aforesaid Africans as shall secure to them their liberty,
to which," he says, "without doubt, they are by law entitled." To
this the Secretary of State replies:
"Viewing this communication as an evidence of the benevolence of her Majesty's Government —-under which aspect alone it could be entertained by the Government of the United States--I proceed, by direction of the President, to make, in reply, a few observations suggested by the topics of your letter. The narrative presented therein, of the circumstances which brought these negroes to our shores, is satisfactory evidence that her Majesty's Government is aware that their introduction did not proceed from the wishes or direction of the Government of the United States. A formal demand having been made by the Spanish minister for the delivery of the vessel and property, including the negroes on board, the grounds upon which it is based have become the subject of investigation before the judicial tribunals of the country, which have not yet pronounced their final decision thereupon. You must be aware, sirs, that the Executive has neither the power nor the disposition to control the proceedings of the legal tribunals when acting within their own appropriate jurisdiction."
[48] Return to top
How sensitive the Secretary is now! How quick to perceive an impropriety! How alive
to the honor of the country--much more so, indeed, than the case required. How different
his course from that pursued toward the Spanish minister, who had been from the beginning
to the end pressing upon our government demands the most inadmissible, the most unexampled,
the most offensive, and yet received from the Secretary no answer, but either a prompt
compliance with his requirements, or a plain demonstration of regret that compliance
was impracticable. Not one attempt do we find by the Secretary to vindicate the honor
of the country, or to press the Spanish minister to bring forward his warrant for
such unexampled, such humiliating demands. Neither does he intimate in the case of
the Spanish claim, that it is received on the ground of "benevolence."
Indeed he could not very well offer that as an apology. Benevolence! The burning
of these forty Africans at the stake, as the result of a compliance by our Executive
with the Spanish demand, would hardly tend to exhibit or inspire "benevolence."—-No,
it was for vengeance that they were demanded, admitted to be so in this very letter.
In the same letter the Secretary of State does not undertake to controvert the principles
set forth by Mr. Calderon, nor the arguments urged by Mr. Argaiz; but repeats that
they had been submitted to the President for consideration. And that is all the answer
ever given to the Spanish legation. He then refers to various personal conversations
with the minister of Spain.
"It was hoped that, in the various conversations which have since taken place
with the Chevalier d'Argaiz at this department, on the same subject, he would have
discovered additional evidence of the desire of the United States Government to do
justice to the demand and representation addressed to it in the name of that of Spain,
as fully and as promptly as the peculiar character of the claim admitted. From the
repeated communications of the Chevalier d'Argaiz, pressing for the disposal of the
question; from his reiterated offer of suggestions as to the course by which he deems
it incumbent upon this Government to arrive at a final decision; and from the arguments
in support of those suggestions, which the undersigned does not perceive the utility
of combating at the present stage of the transaction."
[49] Return to top
The Secretary makes no pretension to contest the claims of Spain—-not even a suggestion
of the idea that these claims are inadmissible, or that, if pressed, they would be
offensive. In these conversations, many things may have been said which perhaps it
would not have been deemed compatible with the public interest to make public. I
shall justify this intimation before I am through with this remarkable correspondence.
But it is evident there was no resistance of the claims in question as to their justice,
no examination of their principles. The Secretary says he does not perceive the utility
of combating any of these demands or allegations, and he refers to these private
conversations as evidence that the Government is perfectly disposed to do all that
is demanded. He continues by saying—
"The Government of the United States cannot but perceive with regret that the
Chevalier d'Argaiz has not formed an accurate conception of the true character of
the question, nor of the rules by which, under the constitutional institutions of
the country, the examination of it must be conducted; nor a correct appreciation
of the friendly disposition toward Her Catholic Majesty's Government, with which
that examination was so promptly entered upon. In connection with one of the points
in the Chevalier d'Argaiz's last note, the undersigned will assure him, that whatever
be, in the end, the disposal of the question, it will be in consequence of a decision
emanating from no other source than the Government of the United States; and that,
if the agency of the judicial authority shall have been employed in conducting the
investigation of the case, it is because the judiciary is, by the organic law of
the land, a portion, though an independent one, of that Government."
That is to say, so it is, and we can't help it, the judiciary is independent, it
must have its course, and we cannot help it. He proceeds:
"As to the delay which has already attended, and still may attend, a final decision, and which the Chevalier d'Argaiz considers as a legitimate subject of complaint, it arises from causes which the undersigned believes that it would serve no useful purpose to discuss at this time, farther than to say that they are beyond the control of this department, not that it is not apprehended that they will affect the course which the Government of the United States may think it fit ultimately to adopt."
[50] Return to top
The Spanish minister is here given to understand, in his ear, that care had been taken to prevent the Africans from being placed beyond the control of the Executive, and therefore he need be under no apprehension that the decision of the courts, whatever it may be, "will affect the course which the Government of the United States may think it fit ultimately to adopt." What other construction can possibly he given to this paragraph? If any other is possible from the words there are facts in the case which prove that this was what was intended. The Secretary proceeds with his explanations and apologies.
"The undersigned indulges the hope that, upon a review of the circumstances
of the case, and the questions it involves, the Chevalier d'Argaiz will agree with
him in thinking that the delay which has already occurred is not more than commensurate
with the importance of those questions; that such delay is not uncommon in the proceedings
and deliberations of governments desirous of taking equal justice as the guide of
their actions; and that the caution which it has been found necessary to observe
in the instance under consideration, is yet far from having occasioned such procrastination
as it has been the lot of the United States frequently to encounter in their intercourse
with the Government of Spain."
"With regard to the imprisonment of Don Jose Ruiz, it is again the misfortune
of this Government to have been entirely misapprehended by the Chevalier d'Argaiz,
in the agency it has had in this, an entirely private concern of a Spanish subject.
It was no more the intention of this department, in what has already been done, to
draw the Chevalier d'Argaiz into a polemical discussion with the Attorney of the
United States for the district of New York, than to supply Don Jose Ruiz, gratis,
with counsel in the suit in which he had been made a party. The offer made to that
person of the advice and assistance of the District Attorney, was a favor—-an entirely
gratuitous one—-since it was not the province of the United States to interfere in
a private litigation between subjects of a foreign state, for which Mr. Ruiz is indebted
to the desire of this government to treat with due respect the application made in
his behalf in the name of her Catholic Majesty, and not to any right he ever had
to be protected against alleged demands of individuals against him or his property."
Here, then, it is avowed that the Executive government of this nation had interposed
in a suit between two parties, by extending a favor entirely gratuitous to one of
the parties, who, it is at the same time admitted, had no claim whatever to this
gratuitous aid. And then comes the exhibition which I have already read, of the national
sympathy, in which all the authorities of the country are alleged to have participated,
and the assumption, under which all the proceedings have been carried on, that there
was but one party aggrieved in the case, and that party was the Spanish slave traders.
[51] Return to top
On the 25th of December the Chevalier d'Argaiz addressed a long letter to the Secretary of State, in which he acknowledges the receipt of the last letter, to which "it would be superfluous" -—the word is ocioso, idle—-to reply, inasmuch as the Secretary of State does not seem to have considered it requisite in the present situation of the affair, to combat the arguments adduced by the undersigned. The delicacy of the undersigned does not, however, allow him to pass over (desoir ) certain insinuations (remarks) contained in the said note; and it will, perhaps, be difficult for him to avoid adducing some new argument in support of his demands."
The Secretary had never met these claims and arguments, as it was his duty to do,
and the Spanish minister is continually reminding him that he does not answer his
arguments. He then refers him to his own course, and says, " The undersigned
would not have troubled the Government of the Union with his urgent demand, if the
two Spaniards (who, as the Secretary of State, in his note of the 12th, says, 'were
found in this distressing and perilous situation by officers of the United States,
who, moved by sympathetic feelings, which subsequently became national,') had not
been the victims of an intrigue, as accurately shown by Mr. Forsyth, in the conference
which he had with the undersigned on the 21st of October last."
He here refers to a private conference in which the Secretary of State had accurately
shown that the two Spaniards in New York were the "victims of an intrigue."
The Secretary of State of the United States, then, had confidentially and officially
informed the Spanish minister that the two Spaniards, in being arrested at the suit
of some of these Africans, were the "victims of an intrigue." What the
Secretary meant by "victims of an intrigue," is not for me to say. These
Spaniards had been sued in the courts of the state of New York by some of my clients,
for alleged wrongs done to them on the high seas—-for cruelty, in fact, so dreadful,
that many of their number had actually perished under the treatment. These suits
were commenced by lawyers of New York—-men of character in their profession.
[52] Return to top
Possibly they advised with a few other individuals—-fanatics, perhaps, I must call them, recording to the general application of language, but if I were to speak my own language in my own estimate of their character, so far as concerns this case, and confining my remarks exclusively to this present case, I should pronounce them the FRIENDS OF HUMAN NATURE—-men who were unable to see these, their fellow men, in the condition of these unfortunate Africans, seized, imprisoned, helpless, friendless, without language to complain, without knowledge to understand their situation or the means of deliverance—-I say they could not see human beings in this condition and not undertake to save them from slavery and death, if it was in their power—-not by a violation of the laws, but by securing the execution of the laws in their favor. These are the men whom the American Secretary of State arraigns in a confidential conversation with the minister of Spain, as the instigators of "an intrigue" of which he holds these disappointed slave-holders to be the unfortunate victims. The Chevalier goes on:
"The Secretary of State, however, says that 'he cannot but perceive with regret
that the Chevalier d'Argaiz has not formed an accurate conception of the true character
of the question, nor of the rules by which, under the constitutional institutions
of this country, the examination of it must be conducted.' Possibly the undersigned
may not have formed such an accurate conception of this affair, since it has been
carried within the circle of legal subtleties, as he has not pursued the profession
of the law; but he is well persuaded that, if the crew of the Amistad had been composed
of white men, the court, or the corporation to which the Government of the Union
might have submitted the examination of the question, would have observed the rules
by which it should be conducted under the constitutional institutions of the country,
and would have limited itself to the ascertainment of the facts of the murders committed
on the 30th of June; and the undersigned does not comprehend the privilege enjoyed
by negroes, in favor of whom an interminable suit is commenced, in which everything
is deposed by every person who pleases; and, for that object, an English doctor,
who accuses the Spanish government of not complying with its treaties, and calumniates
the Captain General of the island of Cuba, by charging him with bribery."
[53] Return to top
Here it is made the subject of complaint from a foreign ambassador to the Executive Government of the United States, that in a court of the United States, in a trial for the life and liberty of forty human beings, the testimony of "an English doctor" was received. And this complaint also was received without a reply. The "English doctor," thus spoken of, was Doctor Madden, a man of letters, and in the official employ of the British Government, in a post of much importance and responsibility, as the superintendent of liberated Africans at Havana. His testimony was highly important in the case and was admitted in the court below, and now forms a part of the record now before your Honors. He does not use the word bribery in reference to the Governor General of Cuba.
End Part 2.
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