View Document Frames
"The Amistad," New York Commercial Advertiser., 24 Sept. 1839.
THE AMISTAD
The anxiously expected decision of the Circuit Court, upon the questions raised by the habeas corpus, was pronounced yesterday morning, in the presence of as many persons as could possibly find place in the Court-room. What it would be no one could form an opinion; and of course it was listened to with deep and profoundly silent attention. We are enabled to place it before our readers almost in the very words of the learned Judge who gave it.
Decision of Judge Thompson
On the opening of the Circuit Court, Monday September 23d, Judge Thompson gave his decision with respect to the application of the prisoners' counsel, to have the Africans discharged under the writ of habeas corpus--and denied the motion. He said the question before the Court was simply as to the jurisdiction of the District Court over this subject matter. He regretted that the case had not been held up for farther consideration, and that he had so little opportunity to examine the various important questions that are involved in it, with that thoroughness and deliberation that were desirable. He regretted this the more as the case is a very peculiar and complicated one. It was one also difficult to be understood by the public. He could not be insensible to the fact that the feelings of the community were deeply involved in the question, and he feared there might be misapprehension of the real questions to be disposed of by the Court. It is possible, he said, that there may be some misrepresentation. He would therefore have preferred that time should have been allowed for him to give a written opinion. But the counsel have thought it advisable, and he did not say it was not excusable, to call upon the Court to dispose of the case now, and he was compelled, though much against his wishes, to dispose of it in the best way he could.
The question to be decided now is not as to the ultimate rights of either party,-- but it is whether the District Court can take cognizance of the subject matter that grows out of this case. In order to ascertain this, we must recur to the laws of the United States. The case has been placed before the Court on the abstract right of holding human beings in bondage, or on the general question of slavery. The Court is not called upon here to determine this abstract question. It is sufficient to say that the constitution of the United States, although the term slavery is not used, and the laws of the United States, do recognize the right of one man to have the control of the labor of another man. The laws of the country are founded upon this principle. They recognize this kind of right. Whatever private motives the Court may have, or whatever may be their feelings, on this subject, they are not to be brought into view in deciding upon this question. They must give the same construction to the laws of the land, sitting in this state, as they would were they sitting in Virginia. It is the province and the duty of the Court to determine what the laws are, and not what it might be desirable they should be. My feelings, said Judge Thompson, are personally as abhorrent to the system of slavery as those of any man here, but I must on my oath, pronounce what the laws are on this subject. The true question then is as to the law, and not as to any of the questions involved in the case. The simple question to determine is as to the right of the District Court of Connecticut to take cognizance of the matter.
Under the laws of the United States all seizures in a district are to be taken notice of in that district where the seizure is made. The important question is always as to the place of seizure, and the question always turns upon that. If a seizure is made within the limits of a state, the jurisdiction of the District Court is local. If it is made on the high seas any District Court may take cognizance of the matter.--Where then was the seizure made in this case? It seems to be agreed by the counsel on both sides that the seizure was actually made in the district of New York. If that be the case this District Court has no jurisdiction of it whatever. But if the seizure was in fact made on the high seas this District Court has jurisdiction. Judge T. said he had supposed at first, that the seizure was in fact made in the district of New York, but when he came to examine the matter he found it was not so. Lieut. Gedney, in his libel, states no such thing. He says he was on a survey within the state of New York, but he does not say that he actually discovered the schooner Amistad within that district, and that he made the seizure within the district of New York. All the evidence before the court is what is set forth in the libel.--The vessel it seems was taken off Montauk Point. The grand jury, in their statement, say it was a mile distant from the shore. If this be correct it was a seizure upon the high sea, and therefore the matter is rightfully before the Court for this district.
In the absence of absolute certainty on the point the Court can endeavor to ascertain from the best evidence in their reach, by examining maps and charts, the locality of the place; and after making such an examination, they are of opinion that the actual place of seizure does not appear to be within the jurisdiction of the District Court of New York, but upon the high seas. The admiralty jurisdiction upon the ocean extends to low water mark. Between high and low water mark there is alternate jurisdiction between the admiralty and common law courts. In deciding then that the seizure was made, in the judgment of the Court, upon the high seas--if either party is dissatisfied, the Court can institute inquiry to ascertain the exact place, but the more regular course is for the party dissatisfied to interpose a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court, and then the District Court must institute an inquiry to ascertain where the seizure was made. It is not competent then for this Court, at the present time, to say the District Court has no jurisdiction in the case. Consequently this Court can not now pass upon the question as to the property--that matter belongs to the District Court. Should either party be dissatisfied with the decision of that Court, an appeal can be taken to the Circuit Court, and afterward to the Supreme Court of the United States. Meantime the parties must be put to their pleas in the District Court, in order that all that the facts&c. may be put upon record.
It has been said this is a question of liberty, and therefore that this Court ought to decide the case in a summary and prompt manner. But, in the judgment of the court, this ought to have no influence in the decision. The situation of the prisoners is such that they must be taken care of by somebody. They did not come here voluntarily. It is not the case, therefore, of persons coming here of their own accord, and being taken up by other persons against their will. If the District Court has jurisdiction of the schooner, they have jurisdiction of the persons of these Africans and they are bound to provide necessaries for them. They can provide for them as well as any other persons. The case seems to have been argued on the part of the prisoners as if they ought to be discharged if the Court has no jurisdiction. This is not so. If it should be decided that the District Court here has no jurisdiction they can decide also that the cause be submitted to the District Court of New York. The Court would, in that case, send vessel and cargo, and everything appertaining, to that Court. The prisoners would not be discharged, but sent also to the District Court of New York. No benefit would arise to them in being removed from this to another district. It is therefore a matter of no consequence to the prisoners whether the question is tried here or in the district of New York.
It has been said that the subsequent proceedings in filing these libels and claims here, were without authority. But if the case is within the jurisdiction of the District Court, other libels could be filed. It is true, that if the original bills have been filed in order to bring the matter within the jurisdiction of this Court, the proceedings may be irregular. If there is any irregularity, it can be corrected by filing a new libel--the case being in the possession of the District Court, however, it is bound to receive claims of any body. This Court cannot decide whether these Spaniards have a right to these persons, or whether they should be put in the possession of the President of the United States. These questions are not now regularly before the Court. They must come up hereafter, and the Court must dispose of them. The courts of the United States have taken cognizance of cases analogous to this. The question of jurisdiction is a preliminary question, and the Court should not decide questions of abstract right. The courts of the United States have taken cognizance of cases where foreigners claimed the persons of slaves. But this is the first instance where a writ of habeas corpus has been applied for. It has never been made a question whether they were instantly free on being brought into the United States. The case of the Antelope is directly in point. The Spanish and Portuguese consuls claimed these subjects as property--the Court said they must show their title.
There may be an impression here, that because slavery is not tolerated in Connecticut, the right of these Spaniards should not be investigated. The court, however, must be governed by the laws of the United States, and not by the laws of the state of Connecticut. Our form of Government recognized the right to import slaves up to the year 1808. It is true the constitution does not use language, but it recognizes that right up to a certain period, and declares that till then it was a lawful importation.--The constitution also provides for the recovery of persons that may escape from one state into another where service is due. It goes even beyond this, and interdicts the states from passing laws that oppose claimants from taking fugitive persons in the free states. Should any state pass such laws, they would be absolutely void. We must look at things as they are. The court feel bound, therefore, to say that there is no ground upon which they can entertain the motion under the writ of habeas corpus.
They fear that some misapprehension exists in the public mind as to the effect and ground on which the case has been disposed of by the grand jury under the direction of the Court. The question now disposed of has not been affected by what previously was that there had been no criminal offense cognizable by the courts of the United States. If the offense of murder has been committed on board a foreign vessel, with a foreign crew and with foreign papers, this is not an offense against the United States. It is an offense against the laws of the country to which the vessel belonged. The courts of the United States have, in such cases, no jurisdiction--but if the offense be against the laws of nations this court would have jurisdiction. A murder committed, as in the case of the captain of the Amistad, is not a crime against the laws of nations, connected as it is with the slaves trade.
The Court said that as they perceived there were note-takers present they hoped they would be careful to make a true representation of the decision.--The Court does not undertake to say that these Africans have no right to their freedom, but leave that matter in litigation in the District Court, subject to appeal. And for reasons assigned, deny this motion.
One of the counsel for the prisoners then asked the Court if they meant to express the opinion that a foreigner coming here with a slave can call upon the U.S. Courts to enforce the claim of the foreigner to the slave. Judge Thompson, in reply, said he did not wish to decide now upon the abstract question.--As a judge he did not feel called upon to decide it. The Court as then adjourned sine die.
The District Court was opened. The judge said he should direct that the U.S. attorney
should repair to Montauk Point, in the revenue cutter, with a gentleman on the other
side, to investigate the facts, ascertain where the seizure was actually made, &c;
that the Court would be adjourned to meet in Hartford on the third Tuesday in November
next; and that meantime it would be the duty of the marshal to see that the prisoners
were comfortably situated, and provided with clothes suited to the season, that they
had sufficient food, medical attendance&c. The Court would it is presumed allow
the prisoner to be discharged on giving bail, but as it must be on appraisement their
counsel would not consent to it. The prisoners will probably be remanded to the jail
in New Haven.
