View Document Frames
Richmond Enquirer, 01 October, 1839, p. 2.
DOMESTIC
DECISION OF JUDGE THOMPSON
On the opening of the Circuit Court, Monday, September 23d, Judge Thompson gave his
decision with respect to the application of the prisoners' counsel to have the Africans
discharged under the writ of habeas corpus--and denied the motion. He said
the question before the Court was simply as to the jurisdiction of the District Court
over this subject matter. He regretted that the case had not been held up for further
consideration, and that he had so little opportunity to examine the various important
questions that are involved in it with that thoroughness and deliberation that was
desirable--He regretted this the more as the case is a very peculiar and complicated
one. It was one also difficult to be understood by the public. He could not be insensible
to the fact, that the feelings of the community were deeply involved in the question,
and he feared there might be misapprehensions of the real questions to be disposed
of by the Court. It is possible, he said, that there may be some misrepresentation.
He would, therefore, have preferred that time should have been allowed for him to
give a written opinion. But the counsel having thought it advisable--he did not say
it was not excusable--to call upon the Court to dispose of the case now, he was compelled,
though much against his wishes, to dispose of it in the best way he could.
The question to be decided now, is, not as to the ultimate rights of either party--but
it is, whether the District Court can take cognizance of the subject matter that
grows out of this case. In order to ascertain this, we must recur to the laws of
the United States. The case has been placed before the Court on the abstract right
of holding human beings in bondage, or on the general question of slavery. The Court
is not called upon here to determine this abstract question. It is sufficient to
say that the Constitution of the United States, although the term slavery is not
used, and the laws of the U.S. do recognize the right of one man to have the control
of the labor of another man. The laws of the country are founded upon this principle.
They recognize this kind of right. Whatever private motives the Court may have, or
whatever may be their feelings on this subject--they are not to be brought into view
in deciding this question. They must give the same construction to the laws of the
land, sitting in this State, as they would, were they sitting in Virginia. It is
the province and the duty of the Court to determine what the laws are, and not what
it might be desirable they should be. My feelings, and Judge Thompson, are personally
as abhorrent to the system of slavery as those of any man here, but I must, on my
oath, pronounce what the laws are on this subject. The true question, then, is as
to the law and not as to any of the questions involved in the case. The simple question
to determine is as to the right of the District Court of Connecticut to take cognizance
of the matter.
Under the laws of the United States, all seizures in a District are to be taken notice
of in that District where the seizure is made. The important question is always as
to the place of seizure, and the question always turns upon that. If a seizure is
made within the limits of a State the jurisdiction of the District court is local.
If it is made on the high seas, any District Court may take cognizance of
the matter. Where then was the seizure made in this case? It seems to be agreed by
the counsel on both sides, that the seizure was actually made in the District of
New York. If that be the case, this District Court has no jurisdiction of it whatever.
But if the seizure was in fact made on the high seas, this District Court has jurisdiction.
Judge T. said he had supposed, at first, that the seizure was in fact made in the
District of New York, but when he came to examine the matter, he found it was not
so.--Lieut. Gedney, in his libel, states no such thing. He says he was on a survey
within the State of New York, but he does not say that he actually discovered the
schooner Amistad within that District, and that he made the seizure within the District
of New York. All the evidence before the Court is what appears in the libel.--The
vessel, it seems, was taken off Montauk point.--The Grand Jury, in their statement,
say it was a mile distant from the shore. If this be correct, it was a seizure upon
the high seas, and therefore the matter is rightfully before the Court for this District.
In the absence of absolute certainly on this point, the Court can endeavor to ascertain,
from the best evidence in their reach, by examining maps and charts, the locality
of the place; and after making such an examination, they are of opinion that the
actual place of seizure does not appear to be within the jurisdiction of the District
Court of New York, but upon the high seas. The Admiralty jurisdiction upon the ocean
extends to low water mark. Between high and low water mark there is alternate jurisdiction
between the admiralty and common law courts. In deciding then that the seizure was
made, in the judgment of the Court upon the high seas,--if either party is dissatisfied,
the Court can institute inquiry to ascertain the exact place; but the more regular
course is for the party dissatisfied to interpose a plea to the jurisdiction of the
Court, and then the District Court must institute an inquiry to ascertain where the
seizure was made. It is not competent, then, for this Court, at the present time,
to say the District Court has no jurisdiction in the case. Consequently, then this
Court cannot now pass upon the question as to the property--that matter belongs to
the District court. Should either party be dissatisfied with the decision of that
Court, an appeal can be taken to the Circuit Court, and afterward to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Meantime the parties must be put to their pleas in the
District Court, in order that all the facts, &c., may be put upon record.
It has been said, this is a question of LIBERTY, and therefore, that this Court ought
to decide the case in a summary and prompt manner. But in the judgment of the Court,
this ought to have no influence in the decision. The situation of the prisoners is
such that they must be taken care of by some body. They did not come here voluntarily.
It is not the case, therefore, of persons coming here of their own accord, and being
taken up by other persons against their will. If the District Court has jurisdiction
of the schooner, they have jurisdiction of the persons of these Africans, and they
are bound to provide necessaries for them. They can provide for them as well as any
other persons. The case seems to have been argued on the part of the prisoners' counsel
as if they ought to be discharged if the Court has no jurisdiction. This is not so.
If it should be decided that the District Court here has no jurisdiction, they can
decide also that the cause be transferred to the District Court of New York. The
Court would, in that case, send the vessel and cargo, and every thing appertaining,
to that Court. The prisoners would not be discharged, but sent also too the District
Court of New York. No benefit would arise to them in being removed from this to another
district. It is, therefore, a matter of no consequence to the prisoners whether the
question is tried here or in the district of N. York.
It has been said, that the subsequent proceedings in filing these libels and claims
here, were without authority. But if the case is within the jurisdiction of theDistrict
Court, other libels could be filed. It is true that if original libels have been
filed in order to bring the matter within the jurisdiction of this Court, the proceedings
may be irregular. If there is any irregularity, it can be corrected by filing a new
libel--the case being in the possession of the District Court, it is bound to receive
claims of any body. This Court cannot decide whether these Spaniards have a right
to these persons, or whether they should be put in the possession of the President
of the U. S. These questions are not now regularly before the court. They must come
up hereafter, and the court must dispose of them. The courts of the U.S. have taken
cognizane of cases analagous to this. The question of jurisdiction is a preliminary
question, and the court should not decide questions of abstract right -- The courts
of the U.S. have taken cognizane of cases where foreigners claimed the persons of
slaves. But this is the first instance where a writ of habeas corpus has been applied
for. It has never been made a question whether whether (sic) they were instantly
free on being brought into the U.S. The case of the Antelope is directly in point.
The Spanish and Portuguese consuls claimed these subjects as proerty--the court said
they must show their title.
There may be an impression here, that because slavery is not tolerated in Connecticut,
that the right of these Spaniards should not be investigated. The Court, however,
must be governed by the governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Our form
of government recognized the right to import slaves up to the year 1808. It is true
the Constitution does not use that language, but it recognizes the right to a certain
period, and declares that till then it was a lawful importation. The Constitution
also provides for the recovery of persons that may escape from one State into another,
where service is due. It goes even beyond this, and interdicts the States from passing
laws that oppose claimants from taking fugitive persons in the free States. Should
any State pass such laws, they would be absolutely void. We must look at things as
they are. The Court feel bound therefore, to say, that there is no ground upon
which they can entertain the motion under the writ of habeas corpus.
They fear that some misapprehension exists in the public mind as to the effect and
ground on which the case has been disposed of by the Grand Jury, upon the directions
of the Court. The question now disposed of has not been affected by what previously
took place.--The only matter settled previously, was, that there had been no criminal
offence cognizable by the Courts of the United States. If the offence of murder has
been committed on board a foreign vessel, with a foreign crew and with foreign papers,
this is not an offence against the laws of the country to which the vessel belonged.
The Courts of the United States have, in such cases, no jurisdiction; but if the
offence be aginst the laws of nations, this Court would have jurisdiction. A murder
committed, as in the case of the Captain of the Amistad, is not a crime against the
laws of nations,--were the crime piracy even, it would not be a crime against the
laws of nations, connected as it is with the slave trade.
The Court said, that as they perceived there were note-takers present, they hoped
they would be careful to make a true representation of the decision. The Court does
not undertake to decide that these persons have no right to their freedom, but leaves
that matter in litigation in the District Court, subject to appeal. And for reasons
assigned deny this motion.
One of the counsel for the prisoners then asked the Court if they meant to express
the opinion that a foreigner coming here with a slave can call upon the U. States
Courts to enforce the claim of the foreigner to the slaves. Judge Thompson, in reply,
said he did not wish to decide now upon the abstract question. As a judge he did
not feel called upon to decide it. The Court was then adjourned sine die.
The District Court was opened. The Judge said he should direct that the U.S. Attorney
should repair to Montauk Point in the Revenue Cutter, with a gentleman on the other
side, to investigate the facts, ascertain where the seizure was actually made, &c.;
that the Court would be adjourned to meet in this city on the third Tuesday in November
next; and that meantime it would be the duty of the Marshal to see that the prisoners
were comfortably situated, provided with clothes suited to the season, that they
had sufficient food, medical attendance, &c. The Court would, it is presumed,
allow the prisoners to be discharged on giving bail, but as it must be on an appraisement,
their counsel would not consent to it. The prisoners will probably be remanded to
the jail in New Haven.
